'THE OVERDEVELOPED NATIONS' ROBERT ENGLER

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Daumier

DOES NO ONE HEAR THE PIPER?

Disarmament

Essays on the History, Politics, Economics, Urgency and Future of Disarmament

Published to Coincide with The Convening of the Unheralded United Nations Special Session on Disarmament

The

SIDNEY LEN...

HERBERT SCOVILLE, Jr... NGER

WILLIAM SWEET EARL ...

Edited with an Introduction by

RICHARD FALK

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LETTERS

critics as mothers

St. Peter, Minn.

The answer to Robert Bly's question, "Where Have All the Critics Gone?" [*The Nation*, Apr. 22] was supplied by Bly himself as early as a dozen years ago when he began telling the literary community, as well as all of American society, to give themselves to the mother within them, not to the father—to the "mother of love . . . the mother of the open fields," not to the "father of righteousness . . . the father of rocks" ("The Busy Man Speaks," from Bly's *The Light Around the Body*, 1967).

It is not true that strength and morale have decreased. Critics and poets are simply being mothers and daughters to one another now, as Bly admonished them, showing mutual love, support and openness. The type of Oedipal battle that Bly waged against T.S. Eliot fifteen to twenty years ago, and which he would nostalgically recall as "healthy pugnacity" is not necessary for this generation of poets heeding the voices of Bly and others (Levertov and Rich included) who have recommended emphasizing the feminine, nurturing side of human and literary personality.

Kathryn Christenson

reviewer's passion

New York City

Your TV critic Peter Sourian certainly works up a froth of petulant wrath in his review [Apr. 22] of Jerry Mander's *Four Arguments for the Elimination of Television*. . . . Fortunately Mr. Sourian's passion undermines his credibility. In fact Mander's book is not the nonsensical "diatribe" Mr. Sourian claims it to be but a reasoned, thorough and responsible inquiry; the recommendation in its title may be too extreme for some tastes (and surely for a TV critic's best interests) but it merits more serious consideration than it has received in *The Nation*.

Mr. Sourian's . . . contention that opponents of television are a privileged group who "subconsciously" prefer that the "masses of people" remain ignorant seems quite without foundation; moreover it misses a major point in Mander's book, which suggests that being misinformed and manipulated may be socially more dangerous than being informed and free to discover. . . . *Lynne Sharon Schwartz*

aspirin for a killer

Detroit, Mich.

I believe that Andrew Scull's review, "Adventures in the Brain Trade" [*The Nation*, Apr. 22] missed an important point. He appropriately condemned attempts to "treat" widespread crime medically. Obviously, social problems and not neuropathology account for our national crime epidemic. However, many people do have brain lesions that result in behavior that they and their families, not to mention society at large, abhor. There is little question . . . that physiological factors account for the behavioral changes of pellagra, neurosyphilis, epilepsy and schizophrenia. What do we do—not treat people with these problems for fear of confronting difficult issues of civil liberties?

To cite an example: Charles Whitman went to psychiatrists and complained of severe headaches and uncontrollable violent impulses. Given nothing but aspirin as treatment, he killed sixteen people. . . . The autopsy revealed a tumor in the amygdala, a region indisputably involved in aggressive behavior in man and animals.

In our cognizance of science's potential for abuse, we should not condemn neural scientists categorically as incompetent, reactionary, naive or diabolical. Instead, we should distinguish carefully between cases of demonstrable neural pathology, which offer hope of medical intervention, and massive social unrest, which requires radical social change.

Glenn E. Weisfeld, Assistant Professor
Wayne State University

EDITORIALS

'Absolute Priority'

We address in this issue nothing less than—and nothing else but—the question of human survival. We do this in the spirit that animates the relatively powerless but teeming nations that make up the vast majority of the United Nations, as the world body convenes its Special Session on Disarmament. That is, we raise the truly capital questions about arms and men one-third of a century into the nuclear age, and our contributors grope for their answers, pessimistically but not without hope.

On the eve of UNSSOD, as the U.N. Special Session is abbreviated, it is striking how few people even know that it is happening. It has been discounted, written off, dismissed before the first spokesman gets to his feet to proclaim and deplore the nuclear doomsday. It is simply assumed that nothing can be done by the world's only universal forum to stop the rush to arms. Still, the representatives of 147 countries have thought it worth while at least to express their people's anguish at the prospects ahead. This has not been done in an organized way at the United Nations for many years.

The United States, still by far the pre-eminent nuclear power, has not welcomed this Special Session of the U.N. It will tell us to lay down our arms; we will be accused of the adventurism that we attribute to our great adversary, the Soviet Union. Our principles will be held up to scorn and our professions of peaceful intentions ridiculed. We will be called imperialistic and power mad, irresponsible and uncaring for the rest of the world. When we claim to act as a trustee for the interests of civilization, our bona fides will be sharply questioned.

To these doubts about our reliability as a holder of all that destructive power (in the interest of defense and peace, as we maintain) we can only oppose our declared pacific intentions and the fact that we have not yet used that awful power. We will tell the world that real progress toward disarming can come about only bilaterally—that is, with reciprocal concessions from the Russians. And the world will answer that we and that other superpower have had enough time, three decades, in which to reach those accommodations that will spare the world. They will say that we cannot be left alone to decide mankind's fate in those long sessions behind closed doors at Geneva. They will demand their say, however weak its effect.

At this writing, it is not even known whether President Carter will speak to UNSSOD. What is known is that the American preparations for this session have been lagging, low on the administration's order of priorities.

It is said that SALT has made great progress and that a treaty may be signed in a few months, with the Senate ratification debate to come early in 1979. (The prospects for SALT II are discussed by Milton Viorst in next week's *Nation*.) But listen again to the words of the President at his May 4th press conference: "Our determination is that any SALT agreement would protect the ability of the United States to defend itself against any conceivable attack. We would also insist upon the maintenance of equivalent capability, destructive power

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between the nuclear armaments of our country and the Soviet Union. And on top of that, any SALT agreement would have to provide for adequate proof, verifiability, of the other nation carrying out the terms of the agreement." Those cautious words will not bring the UNSSOD delegates to their feet cheering.

The event immediately preceding UNSSOD was the Middle East arms package of war planes, in which we arranged to arm both sides of the Arabic-Israeli conflict. Thus, it is thought, we can keep the opponents dependent on us and therefore under our control. The world is bound to see that deal, correctly, as an escalation of force, no matter our own strategic motives. It will suspect that similar arrangements will be made elsewhere, when it suits our purposes, and it will note that our business as by far the world's leading arms merchant is flourishing. And as long as the nuclear and the conventional arms races continue unchecked by popular pressures, it will radically discount our attempts to prevent the proliferation of the worst of weapons.

So the United States comes to the United Nations once more with unclean hands, and it is no answer that the Russians' are no less grimy. Naturally, we are less than eager to participate in this forum and look askance at the other nations even as they glower at us. Prof. Victor F. Weisskopf of M.I.T., president of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, stated as well as anyone has the policy we and other major powers should, but do not, pursue (*The New York Times*, May 14): "The reduction and eventual abolition of nuclear weapons *must have absolute priority*. . . . The consequences of nuclear war are irreparable; the consequences of other setbacks in world politics can be corrected."

This issue of *The Nation* is an attempt to state and clarify some of the factors that dictate that "absolute priority," even as the world assembles to consider the grim possibility of failure.

Feckless in Shaba

The Soviet Union is an ally of Cuba and airlifted its troops to Angola. Angola borders on Zaire. Rebels have moved into Zaire's province of Shaba (formerly Katanga) and are gaining against the hapless forces of our man, President Mobutu Sese Seko. It must follow, then, that the USSR is once again out to damage us in Africa and is succeeding with the help of its Cuban stooges.

That vast simplification of the tangled reality is what a great number of Americans must believe after listening to snippets of TV news. The truth can only be guessed at, but it is surely far from that capsule description.

We know a few background facts. Shaba, with 60 percent of the exportable wealth of Zaire, has been bent on secession ever since it ceased to be the Belgian Congo in 1960. Shaba people in the hundreds of thousands have fled from past struggles into Zambia and Angola. Only last year there was an invasion of these rebels against the central government, and 1,500 Moroccan soldiers flown in by France drove them out. They are better organized now and just might manage to hold onto Shaba, with or without the help of Castro. Mobutu (helpless and hopeless) is appealing to us.

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Potentially one of the most economically viable of the African states, Zaire is politically and economically chaotic, always tending to fly apart at its tribal seams. It is hard to imagine who could govern Zaire, or how it might be done, but the corrupt and feckless Mobutu stands not a chance. He is hard-line anti-Communist now, but a few years ago he had the North Koreans training his troops. He was a central figure in the CIA's unauthorized venture into the Angolan civil war, the conduit for supplies and money, much of which stuck to his fingers.

Mobutu has learned well how to cry Communist wolf to attract the attention of the West and occasionally its military aid. We should judge the sense of our elected officials by the degree of skepticism with which they listen to Mobutu's calls for help.

Voice Test

What could just possibly grow into a revolutionary event seems to be taking place in New York City on a thriving, contentious sheet called *The Village Voice*. Its present owner, Rupert Murdoch, an Australian press lord with vast publishing interests here and there, let one of his minions fire its editor over a policy dispute. The staff, in formidable numbers, organized itself to quit en masse unless the firing was annulled. A mere proprietor could not tell *them* who was boss.

That brought a pause, followed by a rethinking. There were new calculations. Stasis set in. At this writing the old editor is still in place, though that could change if the owner is ready to face the music. That, of course, is more Murdoch's problem than the public's.

The daily press of New York—all three of it—has another problem. It might be called Discretion. Or Contagion. What if their own workers were to be infected with the notion that they had a say in who was to be boss? So the solution was to keep quite mum. That came naturally to the city's only evening paper, the *Post*, for the reason that Murdoch owns it. The two morning papers had a somewhat rougher time with a problem that bordered on the ethical. The paper with the largest circulation, the *News*, faced it manfully; it killed a column on the subject by Pete Hamill, a *Voice* alumnus. *The New York Times* printed a discreet item, reporting that one of its own men had been hired as the new *Voice* editor, and gingerly followed the story as it developed with brief accounts on inside pages.

The resistance of *The Village Voice*'s professional staff (and not just the writers, the business side signed up in droves) will not light a powder train against the whims of publishers across this country. We have no tradition yet for this kind of thing, unfortunately. In Europe, partly as a result of the restarting of a free press after the Nazis were kicked out, the idea that the people who actually make the newspaper should have some control of its content and management has taken firm hold. Here, the press is increasingly enchained, conglomeratized and homogenized. In just a few more years a handful of multimedia corporations will be almost alone in the field of communications.

That will produce a kind of press the Founders could never have imagined as they wrote the First Amendment. All the more reason to wish the staff of *The Village Voice* well as they fight for their editorial independence.

DISARMAMENT

The U.N. Session: What Do We Need?

RICHARD FALK

Even a few decades ago, a world conference on disarmament would have aroused real excitement. Now, however, after many tedious propaganda exercises going back to the 1930s, disillusionment and cynicism are deeply entrenched. And so it is not surprising that little attention is being given to the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, the first such world conference of governments around this theme since the end of World War II. There is no prospect of disappointment over the probable results of the Special Session only because no one expects anything to happen.

Even President Carter is assuming the lowest possible profile that decency will allow. Reports are that he is being pressured to make some appearance at the Special Session, but only to deliver a series of generalities designed to assure that no specific steps are taken. This should seem odd because it was Carter who struck a disarmament spark in his Inaugural Address when he declared an intention to work for the total elimination of nuclear weapons during his Presidency. The applause at the time was far greater than he received for any other part of the speech, and the public reaction revealed, what no member of the power elite has ever wanted known, that a real disarmament constituency exists in America. And yet on this most vital of all issues attitudes of the citizenry simply do not matter. Governing the country, once elected, depends mainly on popularity and popularity depends on getting things done, which means satisfying bureaucrats, policy advisers, and special interests. These dominant viewpoints regard disarmament as either silly or antagonistic to their goals.

Among the bipartisan ruling elite in this country there is no fundamental disagreement about the character of national security. This pernicious consensus, evident each year in Congress, insists that "security" mainly means keeping ahead of the Soviet Union, although keeping

Richard Falk, Albert G. Milbank professor of international law and politics at Princeton University, is the author of A Study of Future Worlds *(Free Press) and* A Global Approach to National Policy *(Harvard University Press).*

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IN FUTURE ISSUES

The U.N. Special Session will be meeting for the next several weeks and during that time *The Nation* will publish further articles on the subject of Disarmament, as follows:

CARTER, CONGRESS AND SALT
Milton Viorst

THE U.S. ROLE IN THE ARMS TRADE
Michael T. Klare and Max Holland

SOCIAL COSTS OF THE ARMS RACE
Ruth Leger Sivard

ahead is so obviously a humbug norm, given the thousands of nuclear warheads and the array of weapons systems available for their assured delivery. The illusion of democratic process is sustained by debates on marginal issues affecting the last 1 or 2 percent of the military budget. The situation is compounded by imperial geopolitics that make the United States want to export as much weaponry as possible so as to exert control over foreign governments, while earning the dollars needed to help defray the cost of oil imports and of maintaining a foreign military presence, including numerous military bases and hundreds of thousands of American troops. An imperial tension surfaces with respect to nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers, most especially the United States, do not want other countries to get strong enough to be unmanageable, and so nonproliferation has become a major goal of foreign policy even overriding in some instances the export plans of the civil nuclear industry.

On no issue has the President looked so foolish, in retrospect, as on arms sales. Again his Populist attacks on the American role as the leading merchant of death struck a responsive chord with the public, and yet his period in the White House has witnessed a steady retreat from even the rather modest goals of restraint originally set. The political vacuum on the Left in this country has meant that the pressure on the Center comes only from special interest groups and from the Right, and this pressure does not want to forgo the economic and geopolitical gains associated with arms sales for anything as nebulous as world peace. The absence of progressive or anti-imperial participants in the foreign policy debate was also evident in the Panama Canal debate, where the administration was pulled so far Right in its search for a winning coalition that the end product became virtually unacceptable even to Panama, despite the supine willingness of General Torrijos to swallow national pride for the bromide of temporary financial relief.

The realities seem plain. In the East-West context there is an ongoing arms race whose momentum is accepted by the powers that be as inevitable, despite the prospect of new weapons systems (Trident, cruise missile technology, SS-20) that make the outbreak of nuclear war seem more probable than ever before. In the North-South context there is a willingness to spread super-sophisticated arms around so long as they do not erode the imperial structure of world politics; hence, conventional weaponry are pushed in the Third World, while nuclear weapons are withheld and their acquisition condemned. At the same time, the export of civil nuclear technology inevitably undermines the goals of nonproliferation, and yet to withhold such technology would be to forgo a valuable export market as well as to antagonize some important nationalist governments. The incoherence is apparent.

Underlying all these crosscurrents is an overriding, ugly reality. Most experts who have considered such matters do not think we can avoid the horrors of nuclear warfare much longer if we maintain the present system of security. The respected Swedish International Peace Research Institute continues to warn us that nuclear war is becoming more likely. We go on investing enormous sums on weapons it would be a disaster ever to use. The annual world arms bill has climbed up over the $400 billion mark and the end is not yet in sight. As a result the entire globe has been drawn into the war system at a time when resources are desperately needed



Bas, Tachydromos (Greece)

for social purposes. It is not surprising that militarized politics has emerged virtually everywhere, and with it the brutal repression of dissent and opposition.

The absence of expectations with respect to the Special Session expresses, at bottom, the sterility of politics in this country and others. Instead of fashioning responses that might offer solutions to the most dangerous problems ever faced by the human race, there is ardent indifference or an act of resignation. Indeed, it is this confession of impotence, made manifest in the empty rhetoric of world leaders, that contains a glimmer of hope. Perhaps, at least, the U.N. conference will encourage the formation of a popular movement against militarism that could, if sustained, transform the climate within which politicians operate. In this regard, it may not be too much to say that the impact of Mobilization for Survival here and elsewhere is likely to be the most solid, if unintended, achievement of the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament.

This special issue of *The Nation* has been conceived to address these concerns. We begin with Sidney Lens's piece that explains the danger and indecency of the present reality. Next comes Herbert Scoville's argument that a new SALT agreement, although limited, would be a positive step at this time. We go from there to William Sweet's consideration of what could happen at the U.N. Special Session if India were to pressure the United States to move toward real disarmament in exchange for shoring up nonproliferation prospects. Daniel Ellsberg next explains, in an adaptation of a recent speech, why he regards the neutron bomb

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with such alarm. An important labor leader, William Winpisinger, then shows that labor, even in the defense sector of the economy, can benefit from disarmament if we plan ahead for conversion. We end with a long essay by Earl Ravenal arguing that serious disarmament steps are possible and practical without altering the prevailing conception of security, provided reason is brought to bear. Later issues of *The Nation* will carry additional articles on these themes as the Special Session winds along its five-week course.

Above all, we need to grasp both the sterility of official disarmament discussions *and* the imperative of disarmament. We are at a cutting edge of historical process where to go on as before invites almost certain doom. To change presupposes a popular surge of moral and political energy that can make us find greater security in the disarming process than in the lethal dynamics of the arms race. In such a circumstance, the passivity of the citizenry is an obscenity. Perhaps, at least, a new breed of world order activism here and abroad can arise out of the awareness that this is a time to look elsewhere than to governments to safeguard our future.

Of course, as these articles show, there is no quick fix for disarmament. Nor would many argue that security functions should be turned over at this stage of world history to the United Nations or some kind of world government structure, even if these possibilities were politically feasible, which they are not. Nor can disarmament get very far without some corresponding changes in outlook in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. Still, the United States is the linchpin of the war system as it currently operates. If this country were to demystify the old form of security and work seriously to build security around a movement to abolish war as a social institution, this could have a great effect worldwide. One positive image is to build the sort of abolitionist movement on war/peace issues that made slavery and colonialism unacceptable social forms. A first step is to recognize that the present system is not sustainable and that we had better start working hard for something else. □

Thirty Years of Escalation

SIDNEY LENS

Since 1945, American, Soviet and other diplomats have met at least 6,000 times to discuss "disarmament" and its illegitimate offspring, "arms control," but in thirty-two years not a single weapon has been eliminated by mutual agreement. On the contrary, the arms race—conventional and nuclear, but especially nuclear—has escalated relentlessly, with the two superpowers now in possession of firepower 2 million times greater than all the bombs, grenades and bullets used in World War II. And by now we have entered what is called the "second nuclear age"—the age of plutonium and proliferation—in which forty nations will have the capability of producing nuclear bombs by 1985 and 100 by the year 2000. In light of these developments many experts predict that nuclear war is both imminent and inevitable.

So, why doesn't somebody stop the arms race?

Beginning with Harry Truman, every President has spoken of the ultimate need to achieve, in Carter's words, "zero nuclear weapons." Yet every President has added to the stockpile, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Truman proposed the Baruch plan for world disarmament, but continued to produce atom bombs and in 1949 ordered development of the hydrogen (fusion) bomb, whose explosive force is in the range of millions of tons of TNT equivalent, rather than thousands of tons, as in the fission bomb—or 10 tons, as in the World War II "blockbuster." Eisenhower spoke of "atoms for peace" at the much-heralded December 1953 U.N. meeting, but put the H-bomb into production and pioneered two major escalations in the arms race, the missile and the nuclear submarine.

Sidney Lens is a contributing editor of The Progressive. *His latest book is* The Day Before Doomsday *(Doubleday).*

Proposing a "program for general and complete disarmament" in the fall of 1961, Kennedy asserted that "mankind must put an end to war—or war will put an end to mankind. . . . The risks inherent in disarmament pale in comparison to the risks inherent in an unlimited arms race." But soon thereafter he asked Congress to add $6 billion to the military budget. And so it goes. The cost of "defense" has skyrocketed from $12 billion in 1948, to $80 billion in 1973, to $128 billion this coming year; it is projected at $173 billion by the end of Carter's first term.

Conventional wisdom has it that we must spend such sums (nearly $2 trillion since World War II) to prevent the Russians from "taking us over." This argument has more flaws than a con man's sales pitch. To begin with, the United States initiated the major advances in the nuclear race: the atom bomb (four years before the Russians), the hydrogen bomb (nine months lead), the missile (despite Sputnik), the nuclear sub, the MIRV (Multiple Individually Targeted Re-Entry Vehicle), the MARV (Maneuvering Re-Entry Vehicle), the cruise, the accuracy systems. The United States has always been ahead, and remains far ahead even today when hawks like Paul Nitze are shouting themselves hoarse that "the Russians are outspending us."

To put the Pentagon's kill power in perspective: the bomb that fell on Hiroshima, August 6, 1945, was a 13-kiloton bomb (equal to 13,000 tons of TNT). A study last year, made by an international group of scientists and based on recently declassified material, put the deaths from that one bomb at 140,000. The U.S. arsenal of 9,000 strategic and 22,000 tactical warheads is now equal to 620,000 Hiroshima-type bombs. Or, put another way, it is enough to kill every Russian (if instantly reincarnated) thirty-six times, and every person

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on earth twelve times. And we continue to produce three warheads a day. The Soviets have heavier weapons (in part because some are still liquid-fueled) but they are about half as accurate (a decisive weakness when it comes to what is called "lethality"), and about one-third as numerous—4,500 strategic and 7,000 tactical, a total of 11,500, as against our 31,000.

And even if the Soviets were as strong as our hawks assert, the argument for more weapons would be a hoax. The government claims to pursue a strategy of "deterrence," of stalemate, or "balance of terror"—what Secretary Robert McNamara called "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD). The theory is that, since each side has enough deliverable warheads to assure the destruction of the other as a viable society, no matter who strikes first, both are safe. Neither will dare (unless its leaders go berserk or there is an accident) to initiate a nuclear war.

But while MAD is the *stated* policy of the government, it is not the actual policy. Consider: there are in the USSR 218 cities with a population of 100,000 or more, and 218 medium-sized warheads can destroy those cities as functioning entities, especially if launched from nuclear submarines, which cannot be tracked down or destroyed under present anti-submarine technologies available to the Russians. Hence, a single Poseidon submarine, carrying sixteen missiles, each with ten to fourteen warheads (a total of 160 to 224), can make a shambles of the Soviet Union's urban centers. Allowing for misfires, certainly two Poseidons are more than enough to guarantee McNamara's formula for "assured destruction," defined by him as "one-fifth to one-fourth of the Soviet population and one-half of her industrial capacity." The United States has thirty-one Poseidons, plus ten older Polaris submarines, and is now building the modern Trident, with double the capacity of the Poseidons. If "deterrence" or MAD is our goal, why this immense firepower, why this excess kill capability?

We obviously achieved a stage of "assured destruction" at least a decade ago. McNamara himself made that point in a September 1967 speech, asserting that both superpowers now possessed "strategic nuclear arsenals greatly in excess of credible assured destruction capability." The estimates used by McNamara and the Pentagon since the late 1960s are 95 million to 120 million dead on each side in a nuclear confrontation, plus three-quarters of the industry destroyed. Even earlier, after the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy put the matter more graphically: if the war between the two superpowers had broken out then, he said, everything that the United States had worked so hard to build in 300 years would have been destroyed in eighteen hours. "Even the fruits of victory" would have been "ashes in our mouths."

Moreover, the *type* of weapons the United States is now developing hints at something other than simple "deterrence." The cruise missile, when deployed, will hit within 15 to 30 yards of a target 2,000 miles away. The MARV, the Mark 12-A warhead and other wonder weapons are also incredibly accurate at long distances. The point is that weapons that accurate are not necessary for a "second strike" retaliatory attack on cities and populations. A bomb that can come within a half mile or so of its target is more than adequate for simple "deterrence." Accuracy becomes important, however, when a nation plans a surprise *first* strike that will deprive the adversary of his response. The greater the accuracy the fewer bombs needed to demolish enemy missile silos *hardened* by thousands of tons of steel and concrete. It is not only the size of the U.S. arsenal, therefore, which indicates that the policy makers have a more ominous purpose than simple "deterrence" but the character of the weapons they are developing.

The American people are told that their government wants no more than a nuclear stalemate, the capacity to "deter" the Soviet Union. But current plans go far beyond "deterrence," as Secretary of Defense Harold Brown concedes in his latest annual report. "We have to plan our strategic forces," he writes, "on the basis that *deterrence might fail*." (Emphasis added.) In that case, he says, we need "what are so awkwardly called war-fighting forces," forces that can actually win nuclear wars.

That exposes the nub of the problem—what may be called the "win syndrome." Military establishments always plan for victory, but the present "win syndrome" is unique in at least four respects: first, it has coalesced with a technology that makes possible the extinction of all human life; second, it has created a pro-militarist constituency immeasurably more powerful than the old "merchants of death"; third, it must—and does—undermine internal democracy and countervailing power; fourth, and most ominous of all, it gives the arms race a *self-propelling* character—so self-propelling in fact, that no single human being, not even the President, has the power to stop it unless there is a far-reaching public outcry to end the race.

The win syndrome, to put it simply, leads to Armageddon!

Back in 1945-46 many people associated with the government had grave reservations about The Bomb. Hundreds of scientists who had worked on it pleaded that it not be used. Generals Eisenhower, Arnold and LeMay and Admiral Leahy thought it was a mistake to use it in August 1945. Secretary of War Stimson, who ordered The Bomb dropped in August, had a change of heart in September and urged Truman to form an "atomic partnership" with the Soviets, to forestall an arms race. Bernard Brodie and a group of theorists at Yale wrote that "thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them."

But the official Truman family was convinced that mere existence of The Bomb would cause the Soviet Union—the only serious potential adversary—to become pliant. (In the words of British Nobel Laureate, Sir Solly Zuckerman, this is the best type of victory, where "the adversary surrenders without a shot being fired.") Stimson wrote in his diary that the Soviets "can't get along without our help and industries and we have coming into action a weapon which will be unique." Truman himself told a visitor, according to historian William Appleman Williams, "that the Russians would soon be put in their place; and that the United States would

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

Vadillo, El Sol de Mexico

Superpowers

then take the lead in running the world in a way that the world ought to be run." Russia was so devastated—20 million dead, more than 70,000 cities and villages destroyed—American leaders believed, according to former State Department official Richard Barnet, that "the Soviet Union was not much of a rival." By applying the right pressures it could be forced to accept the American design for a new world order.

The new world order was a vital factor in relations with the Soviet Union and in the arms race that ensued from those strained relations. It requires some explanation.

U.S. national income had doubled during World War II and its capital equipment industry had grown, according to the National Planning Association, to "nearly twice the size which would be needed domestically." Unless the United States could find foreign markets to absorb the goods this excess capacity produced, it would face a depression on the 1929 scale. It also needed foreign markets for its excess capital, since it was selling about $10 billion of commodities overseas annually and buying only $3.5 billion. The balance of payments was so favorable by the end of the war that the United States had accumulated a stockpile of $29 billion in gold (then worth $35 an ounce)—or 77 percent of the "free world's" total reserves.

Everyone of course wanted American goods, but no one had the money to pay for them; friend and foe alike lay prostrate. Washington's Pax Americana was an economic and military program aimed at solving this dilemma. It was two-pronged:

(*1*) A system of grants and loans—$170 billion from 1945 to 1975—to stabilize the economies of America's allies and clients. In return, recipients would agree to two major conditions: first, that the American dollar would be the international medium of exchange; second, that they would open their doors to freer trade and equal investment opportunities—to the immense advantage of the United States, which at that time could undersell and outinvest any rival. Britain, for instance, was required to give up its empire preference system and allow U.S. goods and capital to flow into Commonwealth nations on equal terms with its own members. As John F. Kennedy would note, "foreign aid is a method by which the United States maintains a position of influence and control around the world. . . ."

(*2*) To back up the economic plan, a military program was devised to assure that nations willing to live under Pax Americana would be protected not only from outsiders but most of all from their own people. It made little sense to give aid to a nation that was about to have a revolution and run off into the Communist or neutralist camp. Hence, retaining "friendly" regimes in power was a *sina qua non* of Pax Americana, requiring a Central Intelligence Agency and military machine unparalleled in the history of armaments.

The United States built the biggest navy the world had ever known. It acquired 429 major bases and 2,972 minor ones (before the war it had only a few fueling stations outside its borders) from which it could come rapidly to the aid of harassed allies—either by a "show of force" such as sending ships and/or troops to their ports (something the United States has done on more than 215 occasions since World War II); by giving secret military aid; or in extreme instances, by intervening directly, as in Korea, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam.

Since Truman rejected coexistence with Moscow, the success of Pax Americana depended most of all on a military counterweight to keep the Soviets "in their place." That was required for two reasons, first because it was inevitable that Moscow would support national revolutions in order to reduce the Western sphere of influence; and second, because there was always the possibility that, while the United States was militarily occupied in one place, the Soviets might become adventurous elsewhere. At the outset of the Korean War, for instance, there was considerable anxiety at the Truman White House that the Asian upheaval was a Soviet diversion for an impending attack in Europe. In fact Eisenhower was sent to beef up NATO forces on the Continent for just such a possibility.

Originally it was felt that the atom bomb by itself would stay the hand of the Soviet Union and its allies. By 1948-49, however, it was evident that The Bomb lacked the political clout that Washington assigned to it. The United States suffered three stunning setbacks: Benes and Masaryk were overthrown by the Communists in Czechoslovakia, Mao seized power in China, and the Soviets tested their first bomb at least a decade ahead of our schedule for them. The American response was not to re-evaluate the utility of the atom bomb but to order production of the hydrogen bomb. Like compulsive

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gamblers, ever since then, the response of U.S. leaders to every major crisis or feeling of anxiety has been to put another military chip in the pot. And as the emphasis on militarism grew, the arms race developed what McNamara was to call "a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry." It became institutionalized, rigid, self-propelling.

Three factors contributed to automatic escalation. First, a rampant technology was developing new weapons—and selling them—with no thought to geopolitical or human consequences. Ralph Lapp, one of the early atomic scientists, noted that the imperative of technology was that "if a weapons system could be made, then it would be made." The scale of this "mad momentum" can be gauged by the fact that as of 1973 the federal budget was sponsoring 19,000 separate research, development, test and evaluations projects. Members of the scientific community fought like tigers for a piece of Pentagon research and development (R&D) funds, first a few hundred million, then a few billion, now $12 billion or more a year. Scientists, engineers and theorists at Rand and other think tanks tried to figure out what kind of new weapons the Russians would have six to eight years from now, in order to fashion American weapons to meet or exceed the challenge.

In testimony before Congress some years ago John S. Foster Jr., director of research and engineering at the Pentagon, put it this way: "We are moving ahead to make sure that, whatever they [the Russians] do, or the possible things *we imagine* they might do, we will be prepared. . . . " (Emphasis added.) Sometimes their guesses were grossly wrong, as for instance when they spent $18 billion on the SAGE continental air defense system because they thought it would "deter" the Russians from improving their bomber fleet; it turned out that the Soviets put a low priority on this project at the time. The scientists and engineers continue with their work, however, and once they come up with a new weapons system—say the neutron bomb—the militarists elaborate a strategical purpose to hatch it. There is never any such thing as "enough."

Second, there evolved a set of powerful constituencies with an immense stake in the arms race. Strongest of all was the Pentagon. One might suppose that in a nuclear age the role of the military should be to avoid war, but the Pentagon argued—with some cogency—that its very existence was a mandate to find a way to *win* wars, and it seized on that goal with unparalleled determination. In the process it built an empire such as the world has never seen—$228 billion of wealth (more than that of the fifteen largest utilities and fifteen largest industrial companies combined), more land than the seven smallest states put together, and thousands of lobbyists and public relations persons to sell the program of "more."

There was a major weakness in the preparedness program—defense, *physical* defense—but far from slowing the Pentagon juggernaut, that vulnerability gave it additional momentum. Offensive nuclear weapons can annihilate an adversary many times over, but there is no effective way to defend the United States itself from intolerable "damage," though the military has tried valiantly to find one. In the days of the bomber, before the missile, military officials elaborated a plan for evacuating the big cities—New York, for instance, in fifty hours. This was folly at best—as anyone can attest who has lived through a New York snowstorm—but it became utter nonsense when the missile made its appearance: missile flight time from Moscow to Washington is thirty minutes. The next theory of defense, advocated by Nelson Rockefeller but implemented by Kennedy, was the fallout-shelter program. According to *Life*, in one of the most fraudulent articles ever written, it would save 97 percent of us. Herman Kahn in the meantime introduced a plan to put the urban population in underground cities—complete with schools, factories, etc.—and then issue an ultimatum to the Russians to surrender (since they could kill only a "few" of us and we could kill most of them). Then there was the campaign during the Johnson and Nixon administrations for an anti-ballistic missile (ABM), which would intercept and destroy an incoming Soviet projectile. All such schemes have proven vain—and expensive. There is no defense, though the researchers are still working on it.

In the absence of defense, or what the Pentagon in its exquisite prose calls "damage-limitation," there was no way to win a *total* nuclear war. The Pentagon persists in its search for the one great wonder weapon that will assure total victory but, meanwhile, the emphasis is on wars of lesser, limited nature—at the level of the CIA, which overthrows and undermines unfriendly governments; at the level of wars by proxy (as in the Middle East), and "small" wars of intervention with conventional weapons (as in Indochina and Korea).

In 1974 Secretary James Schlesinger added a new focus to the "win syndrome"—limited *nuclear* wars. Nuclear war should be made "thinkable" by making it *smaller*, by fighting on a limited scale, so that the adversary is "wounded" instead of "killed." Presumably, after being wounded a sufficient number of times he would give up. The National Security Council has seriously discussed nuclear confrontations on at least eight occasions that we know of, but the Schlesinger doctrine of 1974 was the first time limited nuclear war was *officially* approved. Henceforth the United States will not shy from using nuclear weapons on a limited front, say in a war with North Korea, or a war in Europe. For this purpose it already has a plethora of tactical weapons, including "mini-nukes" that can be carried in a knapsack; the neutron bomb; nuclear artillery shells and mines, and pilotless drones which seek out the enemy and attack him from far behind the lines.

Meanwhile the hawks in and around the Pentagon continue to promote arms escalation in the hope that sooner or later they will find either a defensive weapon that "limits damage" to tolerable levels, or an offensive weapon that will make possible a "*disarming* first strike."

With this outlook and the almost limitless sums at its disposal (the only major weapons system it has been denied since World War II is the B-1 bomber), the Pentagon has been able to feed and fatten a host of other constituencies that help it promote the arms race.

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They include the big corporations, each one seeking a piece of the $40-odd billion in military procurement; the AFL-CIO leaders who depend on the arms race for jobs for their members; the think tanks and private institutions like the American Security Council, which develop the ideological arguments for continuing the race; parts of the academic community; legislators bidding for military installations for their districts; the media; local officials, and others. Never before in our history has there been so powerful a complex designed to bend the public mind in the militarist direction.

Finally, there is the postwar phenomenon of anti-communism. Early in the cold war, Senate Minority Leader Arthur Vandenberg expressed what has undoubtedly been the prevailing opinion in Washington. If the United States was to spend more money on "preparedness" it was necessary, he said, "to scare the hell out of the country." The government has been doing it ever since, with a raucous brand of anti-communism meant to convince America's citizenry that if it doesn't vote $128 billion military budgets the Russians will overrun us. Without this anti-communism (preached universally in high places, incidentally, not just by the likes of Joe McCarthy) the arms race could never have risen to its present peak.

What we have, then, is an impersonal system in which scientists and engineers develop new horror instruments without letup; a host of constituencies, with a material or ideological stake in militarism, to promote those weapons, and a vulgar type of anti-communism to seduce the public into believing it is necessary. This triad sustains the arms race, and sooner or later will lead us to Doomsday.

It is folly to believe that the arms race can be terminated by the efforts of "good men"—doves like Andrew Young or Paul Warnke, for instance. Lacking a strong public demand for disarmament, the area within which "good men" must work is narrow. At best, they can slow the *rate of escalation*. They can honestly argue that if they stray too far toward a consistent anti-militarist position they will either be removed from their posts or defeated in elections. What is needed is an aroused populace, building the pressures as in the Vietnam days outside the cloister of government—but ultimately affecting it.

It is not an insurmountable task, and the forces to lead it are currently being assembled. But it will not happen through spontaneous combustion or at no cost. The present generation will have to bestir itself, just as the last generation did against the war in Vietnam—only much more so. For in the truest sense of the word, survival itself depends on it. □

The True Utility of 'SALT'

HERBERT SCOVILLE, Jr.

In Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (July 1968) the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate in good faith on measures leading to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. When the treaty was signed, the two countries agreed to start the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as part of their commitment. Now almost ten years later the United Nations is about to convene a Special Session on Disarmament and it is appropriate to review the prospects that SALT will achieve its goal.

At the start, SALT looked promising. In 1972 an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limited ballistic missile defenses to two sites (in a 1974 protocol this was cut back to one) in each country. This low level of defense guaranteed a state of mutual deterrence between the two countries and should also have reduced incentives for the further procurement of offensive weapons. In fact, the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons, signed at the same time, froze the number of offensive missile launchers for five years. Thus the stage was set for an early halt to the arms race and for moves toward disarmament.

Unfortunately it did not turn out that way. New arms programs began to spring up on all sides. The United States continued its rapid deployment of MIRVs, multiple missile warheads which could be aimed at individual targets, so that now it has more than 9,000 strategic warheads and bombs compared to 4,000 six years ago. The USSR, five years behind the Americans, started testing its MIRVs and now has 4,500 warheads and bombs in its inventory. It further tested four new classes of ICBMs and began replacing its old missiles with new and larger ones. The United States in turn started to develop an entirely new class of strategic weapons, the so-called cruise missiles. These and many other programs kept the strategic arms machines in high gear.

Meanwhile SALT slowed almost to a halt. In 1974 at Vladivostok Presidents Ford and Brezhnev agreed on ceilings for all strategic delivery vehicles and on those that could have MIRVs, but the ceilings were set so far above existing levels that they imposed no restraint. Even these high ceilings could not be translated into treaty language and exceptions were sought to make them even less meaningful.

President Carter in March 1977 proposed significant cuts, about 20 percent, in these ceilings and stringent annual limits on the number of missile tests, which would have sharply curtailed the race to develop and deploy new weapons. However, these proposals were put forward along with several measures that were vulnerable to the accusation of favoring the United States, and the Soviets rejected them out of hand. Since then more serious negotiations have been underway and considerable progress has been made. But the subject is com-

Herbert Scoville is vice president of the Arms Control Association and a board member of New Directions, a Washington, D.C. foreign policy organization. He was formerly assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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

De Nieuwe Gazet (Antwerp)

Atomic Club

plex and the political climate not conducive to bold initiatives by either nation.

SALT faces three major tasks. First, it must try to turn the arms race around, halting the enlargement of force levels, and starting to reduce the number of all types of strategic delivery vehicles, ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and intercontinental bombers. Second, it must bring under control the current program for replacing existing weapons with new ones already developed. Finally, it must put restrictions on the creation of still more advanced types, which could destabilize the current strategic balance.

This last task is the most important—and the most difficult—since, with the large forces already available to both nations, it is the new technology, not the number of weapons that could increase the risk of nuclear war. For example, neither country has at present MIRVed ICBM warheads accurate enough to threaten the ICBM force of the other side; i.e., neither has a so-called counterforce capability. However, the Russian programs to replace its existing heavy ICBMs with more accurate MIRVed versions, and the U.S. programs to replace its Minuteman with a modification of greater accuracy and higher yield, and eventually to supplement Minuteman with a new missile, the so-called M-X, would provide such a mutual threat to the land-based missile portions of the deterrent.

This would create a very dangerous situation, since there would then be a strong incentive for each side to launch a pre-emptive strike in time of crisis—or, at a minimum, to place its missiles on a hair-trigger alert to prevent them from being destroyed in their silos. This latter tactic guarantees invulnerability, but materially increases the chances of an accidental nuclear catastrophe.

How successful are the current SALT negotiations in performing these tasks? The Carter administration finally, on February 23, released the major provisions of the proposed SALT II agreement as of that date. Although Secretary of State Vance and Arms Control Director Warnke met with Soviet leaders in Moscow at the end of April, there is no reason to believe there have been any significant changes or additions to these provisions, only some resolution of different positions on the details. The agreement would consist of a treaty lasting until 1985 and a protocol until September 1980, although this earlier date may have to be extended to three years from the time the agreement is signed if it is to have any duration at all. The basic provisions of the agreement are laid out in the table below.

Tentative Provisions of SALT II Agreement

The proposed Treaty includes the following major provisions:

¶ An initial overall aggregate level of 2,400 strategic systems, to be reduced to an agreed number between 2,160 and 2,250 during the term of the treaty.

¶ A 1,320 sublimit on MIRVed ICBM and SLBM launchers and aircraft equipped with long-range cruise missiles.

¶ A sublimit of an agreed number between 1,200 and 1,250 on MIRVed ballistic missiles.

¶ A sublimit of 820 on MIRVed ICBM launchers.

The proposed Protocol includes the following provisions:

¶ A ban on deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and on the flight testing of ICBMs from such launchers.

¶ Limitations on the flight testing and deployment of new types of ballistic missiles.

¶ A ban on the flight testing and deployment of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 2,500 km, and on the deployment of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km on sea- or land-based launchers.

This agreement contemplates for the first time reductions in the total number of strategic delivery vehicles. Even though the aggregate of 2,250, fixed as the ceiling during Secretary Vance's recent trip to Moscow, is higher than the 1,800 to 1,900 proposed by President Carter in March 1977, it is still a useful step because hitherto ceilings have always been set higher than existing levels. Thus the first task of SALT II seems to be well in hand.

The Soviets have approximately 2,500 delivery vehicles and would be forced to scrap a significant number of missiles (about 250). The United States, on the other hand, is still below the 2,250 and cannot exceed that level until seven Trident submarines become operational in the early 1980s. Thus this basic provision of the treaty clearly leaves the United States in a relatively more secure position than it otherwise would be and cannot be characterized as a concession to the Soviet Union.

As for SALT's second task—controls on weapons in process of deployment—the sublimits on MIRVed delivery vehicles are still very high, as they were in both the Vladivostok Accords and the March 1977 proposal. The 1,320 ceiling is slightly improved by including within it aircraft equipped to launch long-range cruise missiles. This had the double advantage of making the MIRV ceiling somewhat more meaningful and preventing an unrestrained deployment of cruise missile systems. The sublimit of 820 on MIRVed ICBM launchers does not prevent either nation from offering a potential threat to the other's ICBM deterrent force, once sufficient accuracy is attained. Thus the long-term sur-

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vivability of the U.S. Minuteman force would not be guaranteed, but neither would it have been under the 550 limit proposed in March 1977. The opportunity to retain the viability of Minuteman through MIRV limitations was lost when SALT I decided not to deal with MIRVs before they had been deployed. Those persons most critical of the proposed SALT II agreement for not protecting Minuteman are the very ones who opposed limitations on MIRVs in 1970, when only the United States had developed them. Once the United States committed itself to large-scale MIRVed ICBM deployment, it was inevitable that the Soviet Union would insist on being allowed to match this force and thus procure a threat to Minuteman survival. It is a good example of how an uncontrolled arms race can decrease security.

The newest class of strategic weapons, the long-range cruise missiles, which began to be developed immediately after SALT I, has probably been the thorniest problem of SALT II. The proposed agreement would allow air-launched versions with ranges up to 2,500 kms, but the numbers deployed would be limited by the inclusion of the delivery aircraft in the MIRV limit referred to above. A ban on such cruise missiles was no longer possible after Washington decided to abandon the B-1 and to rely instead on cruise missiles to maintain the strength of the aircraft leg of the deterrent Triad (land-based, air-launched and submarine-launched missiles). The proposed agreement thus recognizes this United States security need but unfortunately lets out of Pandora's box a new technology that can be utilized in many other weapons systems.

Sea-launched or land-based cruise missiles with ranges beyond 600 km. may not be deployed, but no restriction is placed on flight testing of such weapons in ranges up to 2,500 km. This permits continued development of such systems during the three-year life of the protocol. Once such weapons are developed and tested, it may be difficult to prevent their deployment; the strategic arms race could thus take off in a totally new direction. Long-range sea-launched cruise missiles have almost no U.S. military application, so this failure to restrict their testing could be an unfortunate loophole, which the United States insisted on but may some day regret. Land-launched long-range cruise missiles have greater military potential, but they introduce an entirely new dimension into the strategic arms race. Based in Europe, they could threaten strategic targets throughout western Russia, revive Soviet fears of German aggression and significantly alter the current strategic balance which now depends only on the intercontinental forces of the United States and the USSR. The failure to ban testing of these weapons creates a touchy problem; what restrictions will be placed on the transfer of advanced cruise missile technology to our NATO allies? It is reported that this may have been settled during the recent Vance-Warnke trip to Moscow, and one hopes that the solution will not allow widespread proliferation of the weapon.

In sum, the proposed agreement does put some useful controls on the deployment of new replacement weapons, but on the whole they come too late and are thus too limited to curb the arms race significantly. MIRVed missiles have already been deployed beyond the point where limits on numbers can prevent the acquisition of a theoretical threat to either nation's ICBMs. The controls on air-launched cruise missiles would in themselves be satisfactory were it not for the fact that the door is simultaneously opened for strategic sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles.

Finally, how does the proposed agreement deal with the third task—restricting the development of new types of weapons? The protocol would ban the flight testing and deployment of mobile ICBMs and limit the flight testing and deployment of new ballistic missile types. These measures could dampen the qualitative arms race, but that depends on their exact details and, of course, on what happens when the protocol expires. The provision relative to mobile ICBMs would halt the feared conversion of their SS-16/SS-20 into a mobile ICBM, which could occur at any time. The protocol cannot affect any U.S. program, since the M-X (the proposed U.S. mobile ICBM) or any alternative thereof will not be ready for testing in the next three years.

The limitations to be put on flight testing of other new types of ballistic missile are unclear. Reportedly, they will not stop testing of the U.S. Trident I or the Soviet SN-NX-18 SLBMs. Presumably they will also not cover the Soviet SS-16, 17, 18 and 19 ICBMs, but could limit follow-on ICBMs now reported under development. Whether any of these would be ready for testing during the lifetime of the protocol is unknown. In any case, no U.S. ICBMs would be affected during the period. Thus, it would appear that the value of this provision of the protocol will rest not so much on its direct effects but on whether it sets a precedent for limitations of longer duration. The success of SALT II in controlling the qualitative arms race will depend to a large extent on whether SALT III negotiations move forward rapidly to cover longer periods of time. But again, since these provisions will not affect significantly any U.S. program but could restrict the Soviet Union, they cannot be argued as unfavorable to the United States.

The proposed agreements do not consider the so-called "gray area" of nuclear delivery systems—those systems that lack an intercontinental range but can reach targets in the Soviet Union and the United States by using forward bases or other means. For example, the United States has based in Europe or on carriers many aircraft that can strike most of western Russia, and the USSR has the new Backfire bomber, which can reach the United States on one-way missions or fly round trip with in-flight refueling. After long negotiations, the Soviets agreed at Vladivostok to drop the U.S. forward-based systems from the SALT II ceilings. The United States has apparently dropped its insistence on counting the Backfires, as long as the plane is not made a true intercontinental bomber by, for example, adapting it to carry long-range cruise missiles. These seem reasonable solutions for SALT II, but the "gray area" systems will have to be addressed eventually, either

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in SALT III, the NATO-Warsaw Pact Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks, or in a new forum.

The implementation of any agreements reached at SALT II does not depend on trusting the Russians (or the Russians trusting us). Available technical means, supplemented by the Standing Consultative Commission established under the ABM Treaty, should be adequate to verify an agreement without risk to national security. While it cannot be guaranteed that every violation would be spotted, the United States should be able to detect any that were significant enough to be dangerous. In some cases where the verification is least reliable, such as cruise missiles, the potential gains to the United States of being allowed flexibility under the treaty to take certain actions more than offset any complications they may present for verification.

The numbers of deployed strategic delivery vehicles can be monitored within a small margin of error by observation satellites. Limits on MIRVed delivery vehicles can be verified by identifying those deployed missiles and launchers of a type that have been used for testing MIRVs. A combination of national technical means can be used to monitor the testing of mobile and other new types of ballistic missiles. Observation of the deployment of mobile missiles is somewhat harder, but the violation of a total ban would run a high risk of being detected. The cruise missile limitations are more difficult to verify, particularly their precise range and mode of launch. A missile can be tested at ranges considerably shorter than its maximum capability, but it is most unlikely that a missile tested at less than 2,500 km. range could be deployed with a range greater than 5,000 km.

The proposed SALT agreement is unquestionably in the national interest of both parties to the talks. Although it will by no means halt the strategic arms race, it is a useful step toward bringing it under control and will insure greater security at reduced cost. Continuing to expand existing arsenals and to exploit technological advances without any restraint can only burden both nations with much larger military expenditures and greater risks of becoming involved in a nuclear conflict.

The importance of stopping the growth in the numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and at last starting to cut back must not be underestimated. Even though the initial reductions are a relatively small fraction of existing stockpiles, this very important change of direction can lead to more significant reductions in the future. The proposed ceiling affects the Soviet Union more immediately and deeply, but it will also force the United States to scrap some weapons or plans for deployment a few years from now. Most important, the agreement is a start toward restricting the qualitative arms race.

This turnabout of the arms race could have profound implications beyond the context of U.S.-Soviet rivalry; it should demonstrate to non-nuclear nations of the world that the nuclear powers are finally prepared to negotiate seriously on nuclear armaments, as they undertook to do in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Concrete evidence of this intent is necessary if we are to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, a contagion of folly that would multiply the risk of catastrophe. □

Delhi: A Third World Overture

WILLIAM SWEET

We owe this month's U.N. Special Session on Disarmament to years of prodding from the "new nations," the "nonaligned nations" and the "Group of 77"—as the Third World countries have been known in their successive political incarnations. From the mid-1950s disarmament has been the only cause on which the new nations regularly could unite, and ever since the Belgrade Non-Aligned Summit of 1961, calls for a world conference have been at the top of the Third World's list of priorities. The convening of the Special Session ought to be a source of deep satisfaction to Third World leaders, and an opportunity to promote an incisive program of arms reduction.

But as it happens, the dream of a world conference is to be realized at a time when disarmament has moved to second spot on the Third World agenda, and when the coalition favoring world disarmament shows signs of internal collapse. This is no mere irony.

William Sweet, based in Washington, D.C., is a frequent writer on arms control. He participated in the recent New Delhi conference sponsored by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies.

Up to December 1976, when the General Assembly decided to convene the Special Session, the decisive obstacle to a conference of this scope on disarmament had been opposition from the United States and the People's Republic of China. Both countries feared isolation in an assemblage dominated by Third World and East bloc states, all favoring "general and complete disarmament" —a formula the United States regarded as cynical propaganda and China as an attempt to freeze the middle powers into a position of permanent inferiority. For both Washington and Peking, Soviet exploitation of Third World sympathies was a specter looming over the disarmament conference schemes.

Today, however, Soviet manipulation of Third World sentiment is no longer a credible threat. The Kremlin is in no position to manipulate, and it is a question whether there is anything to manipulate. As far as moral standing is concerned, Russia like the United States has armed itself beyond what is required by mutual deterrence; it pursues the same controversial anti-proliferation policies that we promote and though it may spend less than the United States does to gain influence in internal Third World affairs, it seems actually to do more. So, if the Third World were coming to the U.N. united in a common pro-

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gram, the Soviet Union would have to take its share of the heat.

But the Third World is not united. The old heroes of the nonaligned movement are dead or fading fast, and the relevance of nonalignment in a multi-polar world is unclear. Individual Third World nations often have more important economic and political relations with the first or second worlds than with one another. Their mutual relations are often strained by bitter disputes, sometimes between states that proclaim radically different ideologies, and the principals in such disputes are unwilling to deny themselves the latest in advanced weaponry or to renounce outside support.

Insofar as any single impulse unites the Third World, it is the drive for a new international economic order. To be sure, the connection in theory between arms reduction and the new order is strong. Disarmament would redistribute power and free funds for human needs. But in practice the connection is weak. Nobody expects the rich and powerful voluntarily to redistribute their resources, and nobody sees a way to force them to do it. There will be no grandiose Third World schemes on the Special Session's agenda, but there may be some useful exchanges and discussions of many small schemes. Of these there are plenty, some quite good, and a few have already been closely examined in conferences organized to evaluate Special Session issues.

One such conference took place in New Delhi during the last week of March. Although hastily organized and not well designed to produce recommendations or reports, it was in some respects an exceptionally interesting gathering. Participants had been selected with a view to strong Third World representation, and of the roughly seventy-five people who showed up close to fifty were from the Third World. It would be too much to call the group a microcosm of the Special Session, since few participants were members of government bodies, but the wide representation did at least insure an airing for most of the arguments that will be heard at the U.N.

The conference had as backdrop, and to some extent motivating force, the dispute between the United States and India over comprehensive nuclear safeguards. Prime Minister Morarji Desai has taken the position that India will accept safeguards on all its nuclear facilities only if the nuclear weapons states, or at least the superpowers, negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty, terminate production of nuclear weapons material, and take significant steps toward complete disarmament. That is a tall order, and if the United States fails to make a positive response, Desai may be expected to take his case to the United Nations. In a plea for Third World support he would say that the United States is still trying to disarm the unarmed.

The Indian participants at Delhi naturally, took every opportunity to test the ground for Desai. It is interesting that they met with only mixed success. Everyone agreed that the current nonproliferation system is unfair and discriminatory. At the same time, most of those present, including many Third World participants, felt that nuclear proliferation would be a poor answer to the big-power

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arms race. It would only further legitimize nuclear weapons, and in many instances would put smaller countries at the mercy of their larger neighbors.

Desai may expect an ambivalent response in New York. The twelve nonaligned nations that take the strongest interest in disarmament are evenly split on ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, there is a serious chance that the United States may improve its position by doing what it can to meet the Indian conditions. In that event, Desai would find that his staunchest allies are Israel, South Africa, France and West Germany, since they are the countries most threatened by the U.S. push for improved safeguards.

Whether the talk at Delhi was of proliferation, Indian Ocean demilitarization, curbs on international transfers of conventional arms, or restraint of the big-power arms race, ambivalence and conflicting interests divided the nonaligned. The conference secretariat, essentially an Indian group, had prepared a fine research report on Indian Ocean demilitarization. The paper opposed proposals to make the area a "nuclear-free zone" and favored superpower withdrawal as "the highest common denominator" on which the Ocean states could agree. Left unstated was the fact that it is India which refuses to entertain any proposal that goes beyond superpower withdrawal.

Participants from the smaller Asian Indian Ocean countries hardly needed to point out that superpower

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withdrawal might mean a new Indian hegemony, a questionable improvement. African participants, on the other hand, noted that an Indian Ocean dominated by Iran and South Africa would not be immeasurably superior to an ocean vexed by superpower rivalry. For the Africans, the prime Indian Ocean issue is South Africa, not Diego Garcia; establishment of a nuclear-free zone might go further to contain South African aspirations than would withdrawal of the U.S. and Soviet fleets.

Whenever Third World representatives found it impossible to reach a consensus, the initiative went back to the camp of the rich and powerful. The Indian Ocean discussions seemed to terminate in a quiet resignation to continued bilateral U.S.-Soviet talks. Similarly, discussions of conventional arms transfers reached no agreement on how Third World countries might curb their appetite for the latest and greatest weapons. In the end, Third World participants were calling on the industrialized countries to impose unilateral embargoes.

Everybody agreed that arms are often no more than "fancy trinkets," sold at great advantage by the rich to the poor, and everybody gave due recognition to the various dependencies created by arms sales—presence of foreign technicians, reliance on suppliers of spare parts, crippling indebtedness to overseas creditors. But there was also evident a great craving for access to "advanced technologies," and much opposition to measures that would freeze the current distribution of world power. While arms sales to a few countries (such as Iran) were held to be unjustifiable on any ground, arms transfers were seen much more often not merely as inevitable but as highly desirable—who would deny arms to the "freedom fighters" in South Africa or Palestine?

Participants in disarmament conferences are naturally reluctant to admit how enticing weapons are, and the participants in this conference were no exception. But they also made it clear that armed struggle has played, and still plays, a big role in ending colonialism, and they indicated that the big powers would have to take the lead if anything were to be done about the more indefensible arms transactions.

What was true of the Indian Ocean and of the trade in conventional arms was also true of the big-power arms race, but with an additional complication: when the talk turned to the military meaning of the arms race and its significance to the distribution of world income, Third World representatives divided not only by region and ideology but also by generation. It was here that the "new economic order" idea confronted the old spirit of nonalignment.

The Indian participants made a lively effort to identify "a new context of nonalignment," arguing in essence that the first and second world are now united in a "nuclear weapons culture," whereas the nonaligned nations shared an interest in promoting a "non-nuclear weapons culture." This sounded pretty good on paper and was put forward effectively by Indian veterans of many a nonaligned summit. But they were no match for the new blood.

"Who cares about a culture?" a Nigerian participant asked. "What matters are the weapons themselves." It is weaponry, after all, that the superpowers use to manipulate Third World disputes, and it is weaponry they cling to for dear life. But even if the superpowers were to divest themselves voluntarily of nuclear weapons, a representative from Trinidad wondered, what difference would that make? Their economic and military superiority still would be overwhelming, and "we'd still be living with bows and arrows."

Questions of this kind proved virtually unanswerable. To be sure, Mary Kaldor, a leading disarmament expert from the University of Sussex, England, was one of those who made a stab at it. It is not necessary, she said, to think of the arms problem in terms of grandiose resource transfers from the rich countries to the poor; funds not spent on weapons will automatically find their way to more productive uses. And yet, however elegant, this is not the kind of argument that galvanizes the Third World. Although cuts in military expenditures would indeed stimulate increased demand for Third World goods and permit increased investment in Third World projects, these would be only marginal improvements in a fundamentally unchanged capitalist system and they would not be seen for many decades.

The lesson to be learned from Delhi is the one we have been learning in other contexts. Bilateral negotiations between the superpowers, it is becoming clear, produce very little disarmament and a great many new suspicions and excuses for prevarication. Attempts to arrive at comprehensive formulas when suspicions are unresolved and interests obviously conflict tend to do at least as much harm as good.

The good ideas at Delhi were the little ideas, not because small is beautiful but merely because it is all we can hope for. Many Third World countries might be able to improve both their security and their prospects for development with reformed regional arrangements. Greater efforts at mutual trade and investment, and unilateral or multilateral declarations rejecting outside support—above all nuclear support—would be generally helpful. In some instances such as South Africa, Saudi Arabia or Iran, neighboring countries might be able to maneuver their adversaries toward lower military profiles. In other instances, close attention to real security needs, as opposed to undue stress on all possible contingencies and global prestige, might enable individual countries to make sensible economies. In the rare cases where a Third World country or a group of countries has some bargaining leverage, it might be employed to extract limited but useful concessions from the big powers. The current dispute between India and the United States is perhaps a useful model. In general, the Third World lacks adequate intelligence information and an adequate medium for the expression of heretical views on arms issues. A new U.N. agency, perhaps a satellite service, could go far to fill that gap.

These are the sorts of proposal that will receive some attention during the U.N. Special Session, and insofar as some ideas start to move, they will be propelled more by private discussions among participating delegates than by what happens in the General Assembly. □

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There Must Be No Neutron Bomb

DANIEL ELLSBERG

The following article is adapted from a speech Mr. Ellsberg made on March 18 to the Neutron Bomb International Forum, meeting in Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

The United States has perfected, and is now ready to produce and distribute, an enhanced radiation weapon, the so-called neutron bomb. Before the military planners actually take these steps, I wish to state several propositions about this particular weapon.

First: No nuclear weapon has been used since World War II. The first such weapon—of any size, by any nation anywhere—that is used for whatever reason in the future will make more likely the use elsewhere, again and again, of other nuclear weapons of all kinds by other nations. That first combat explosion since Nagasaki—whoever touches it off—will lead promptly to further proliferation and use: that is, to the acquisition of nuclear weapons in self-defense by those who do not yet have them, and to imitation of that first use by those who do have them, once the ban on all nuclear weapons has been broken. Thus, the explosion of any nuclear weapon, the first since Nagasaki, will reduce the national security of every country in the world and the chances for survival of humanity.

My second proposition: Of all the nuclear weapons that have been conceived, the neutron bomb is by far *the most likely to be the first used since Nagasaki.* I will not go here into the agonizing effects of this weapon, which led to so much opposition. (Except to point out that it kills only slowly, over hours to weeks, which makes its use bizarrely inappropriate against Soviet tank personnel—the often-mentioned target—whom it would turn into walking dead men, capable of revenge with divisional nuclear weapons.) I shall concentrate rather upon its supposed virtue as a military weapon, which virtue is in fact its worst vice. By the fact that it *does* minimize damage to unintended targets, it is far more likely to be used in military situations.

Its existence and likely use would end the era in which weapons have been merely stockpiled as a source of profit and of threat, and move the world into an era of actual nuclear wars, which will probably end with the extinction of our species and of all life on earth. If produced, the neutron bomb is not only likely to be used, but *very* likely: not so much in Europe, where it confronts Soviet nuclear weapons, but elsewhere.

It is a mistaken belief in America, and perhaps elsewhere, that the world has been far from any possible use of nuclear weapons in the last generation. Indeed, most Americans believe that the U.S. Government has officially committed itself never to be the first to use nuclear weapons in combat, or that it at least tacitly follows a "no first-use" policy. The opposite is the case with respect to official U.S. commitments to NATO, as Europeans are aware, but the impression of forbearance has been carefully cultivated by successive administrations in Washington, which have concealed the fact that they themselves and their predecessors came on a number of occasions, and secretly, very close to using nuclear weapons in the wars we have fought in the last generation, and in certain other crises as well.

With one exception, none of these cases was known at the time to the American public or to most of the rest of the world, and the evidence has come out only recently that White House consideration or threats actually occurred. Here, briefly, are some of the occasions:

¶ Harry Truman in 1950 announced publicly the possible use of nuclear weapons in Korea, and Prime Minister Attlee immediately flew to Washington to protest. That, perhaps, is why no American President since then has publicly mentioned that he was considering such an act.

¶ We know now, as we did not know at the time, that Eisenhower made such threats in an attempt to negotiate an end to the Korean War in 1953. In fact, Nixon came to office believing, probably incorrectly, that those threats had been advantageous in 1953.

¶ In 1954 Secretary Dulles offered Prime Minister Bidault three atomic bombs for the defense of the French troops at Dienbienphu. Fortunately, the French did not accept.

¶ In 1958 Eisenhower, again, committed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan for the use of nuclear weapons if the Chinese should decide to occupy Quemoy and Matsu—the islands immediately off the coast of China.

¶ In 1961 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to Kennedy that he should be prepared to use nuclear weapons in response to a possible Chinese reaction to the occupation of Laos, which they proposed. Probably for that reason, Kennedy rejected their advice to invade Laos at that time.

¶ The United States did, however, invade Vietnam in the next few years and General Westmoreland now reveals in his memoirs that in 1968, when American troops were surrounded at Khesanh as the French had been surrounded at Dienbienphu, we considered using nuclear weapons in their defense.

¶ H.R. Haldeman, in his memoirs, asserts that Nixon and Kissinger, from the first months of their administration in 1969, made explicit, direct and secret threats to use nuclear weapons against Vietnam. They made these threats to the Vietnamese, to their Russian ally and to their Chinese ally. This means that, without knowing it, the world was repeatedly on the brink of nuclear war from 1969 to at least 1972, when those threats were still being uttered secretly in December during the bombing of Hanoi. In fact, I am informed that in early December 1972 the Hanoi delegation warned that it would quit the negotiating chamber if the threats of nuclear escalation continued. Kissinger's reply was to leave the chamber himself and—as we now know—advise Nixon by phone to commence bombing Hanoi, precisely

Daniel Ellsberg, a former defense analyst for the Rand Corporation and the Defense Department, currently works on disarmament issues from his home in San Francisco.

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Oliphant, Washington Star

Our Side of the Table at the SALT Talks

to underline his threats of nuclear devastation.

Why, then, have no nuclear wars occurred since 1945? Clearly not because U.S. aims, efforts and demands succeeded without using nuclear weapons; in all of the above cases except that of the offshore islands the United States ultimately accepted failure. Were the internal proposals unserious; were the Presidents simply bluffing? On the evidence now available, I do not believe it.

Where Soviet forces were directly involved—as in the Cuban crisis in 1962 and the Berlin crisis in 1961—fear of Soviet response was obviously the major concern. But in the instances above the Soviets were not threatened directly and the Presidents believed—rightly or wrongly—that Soviet nuclear response to a U.S. first use of nuclears was a very low risk.

Clearly a major recurrent factor in the miracle that the threats were never carried out was the fact that the weapons then existing destroyed too many people, made the earth too radioactive for too long, to justify their use on any terms, even narrowly military terms. Those weapons would have made the very territory we purported to defend uninhabitable for perhaps half a million years. Therefore the Presidents anticipated a public reaction, at home and abroad, that stayed their hands. If the neutron bomb, with its reduced destructiveness (still massive) and its very short-lived radioactivity had existed, *I believe it would have been used before now.*

The discussion in the United States and in official NATO circles of this bomb has been limited almost exclusively to its possible use against a hypothetical Warsaw Pact or Soviet attack in Western Europe. This focus is, I believe, a conscious hoax, and in any case a dangerous distraction from the true dangers both that it will be used and of what will happen if it is used. Of all potential uses of the weapon, use in Europe is, I believe, the least likely, for the simple reason that Soviet divisions possess nuclear weapons with which they would surely retaliate.

To initiate nuclear war against Soviet tanks, or any other Soviet forces, is to insure a nuclear exchange in which first use could not possibly confer any military advantage, nor could possession of the neutron bomb. The military umpire scoring this particular war game—from some other continent, or perhaps another planet—would not be able to tell which side had introduced the nuclear weapons, or whether it had started with clean or dirty ones. The result would be the annihilation of Europe, if not the world. As a means of defending European territory against Soviet forces, the use of nuclear weapons of any kind has no military advantage over mass suicide.

The neutron bomb does, however, have certain advantages in *other* situations, and that is why its use is possible and its existence so dangerous. Specifically, the neutron bomb is designed for advantageous use *against an opponent that does not possess nuclear weapons*; that is to say, the kinds of adversary the United States has chosen in the wars it has fought in the last generation. For example, the Indochinese, the Koreans, the Chinese in the 1950s. Future prospects would include, again, Korea, the Middle East, or eventually, South Africa.

The neutron weapon recommends itself above all to those who own the buildings, the land and the resources in the area where the bomb may be used—assets which they do not wish to destroy or to make radioactive, but whose enemies are the people of the area, that is, their own countrymen. Thus, it is basically a counterinsurgency weapon, suitable for such U.S. "friends" as Brazil or Iran, either at home or in regional "stabilizing" interventions. And later models of the bomb, with reduced blast and reduced fission products, will be appropriate for such purposes not only in Johannesburg but even within Western Europe.

A few years ago such uses or circumstances might have seemed unlikely. In view of the American policy toward the government of Salvador Allende in Chile, we must draw some historical inferences as to what could lie in store for Europe. The possibility that leftist, Communist, Socialist Parties could come to power in various countries by peaceful electoral processes means that in these countries parts of the armies and certain civilian circles might decide that democracy has become too dangerous and must be destroyed, as in Chile. In such circumstances, the neutron bomb, when and if it came to be available, could be used to deter or suppress resistance to a military takeover, or to turn back an intervening force from a neighboring country.

To sum up: *The neutron bomb is a weapon not merely to be threatened, but to be used. It is a weapon not to prevent nuclear wars but to make nuclear wars happen*, to turn civil wars and counterrevolutionary wars and interventions into nuclear wars in the attempt to win them. *It is the nuclear weapon most likely to be the first one used since Nagasaki.* Most likely—very likely—it would be used initially outside Europe; but it would not stay outside the industrialized areas. Wherever it was first used, it would start a grass fire that would burn its way, not in days or months but within years and decades, within our lifetime or our children's lifetime, to the advanced industrial areas—that is, into all parts of the world. It would cease to burn only with the extinction of all life on earth. The neutron bomb, then, is a match to an oven, for all the people in the world. It must never be lighted; it must never come to exist. □

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The Defense Worker's Dilemma

WILLIAM W. WINPISINGER

Rumor of Weapon Able's demise has, let us suppose, been rife for five years. Workers and community officials have trembled at the prospect. But each time, employers and employees, labor and management, city officials and civic leaders have petitioned Congressman Jones and Senator Smith, who have taken the case to the Pentagon, and each time the funds have been restored. Weapon Able has always come through.

This year, however, Congressman Jones and Senator Smith failed in their mission of mercy. It is now conclusive: the Pentagon insists that the Russians have developed Weapon Counter-Able, making Weapon Able totally obsolete. A new weapon is demanded, wholly different in design, matrix and purpose. Baker, Inc., which makes Weapon Able at its Caltex plant, finds that facility is obsolete too. So are the subcontractor plants and component manufacturing plants.

At this point, panic seizes workers and whole communities. Baker, Inc. could decide to convert its Caltex plant into production of civilian products, but there are other considerations. The company has decided it no longer cares to do business in Caltex. The plant has been wholly depreciated and has no further tax advantages. The unions there negotiated solid contracts over the years and wage and benefit levels are at or above those of Baker plants located elsewhere, primarily in the Sunbelt, producing other weapons and products. In fact, Baker, Inc. management figures the damned union is too strong. It's about time it was broken up.

However one looks at it, Baker, Inc. stands to profit by giving up operations in Caltex. And that's what private enterprise is all about: maximizing profits.

Individually, defense workers may fervently hope and wish for peace, for scaling down the arms race, for an end to the international trafficking in arms. They may want to support SALT agreements, nuclear nonproliferation treaties and restrict arms sales.

Yet for them to support those laudable objectives demands a nobility of spirit and a courage of self-sacrifice that are asked of no other members of society, except those who are called and serve during actual wartime. It is an excruciating dilemma and it makes absolutely no sense—economically, politically or socially. But before we come to that, consider the typical situation.

The Pentagon announces that Weapon Able production is to be halted. Baker, Inc. has been the prime contractor for fifteen years, employing some 5,000 workers to produce Weapon Able at its Caltex plant. Subcontracting firms in two other communities employ another 5,000 people who work at jobs directly related to Weapon Able. At the third tier, a half-dozen firms scattered around the country employ in all 3,500 people to manufacture component parts for the device. In addition, a dozen vendor firms and service suppliers have been directly dependent on the Weapon Able contract; that's a few thousand more people. And in the community of Caltex, as in the dozen or so other communities where subcontractors, component manufacturers, vendor and service suppliers may be located, Weapon Able has an immediate economic bearing on the full spectrum of local economic activity and public finance. In all, 15,000 or more people are directly affected by the fate of Weapon Able, and countless others concerned in varying degree.

For its part, the company was cleverly able to write into its prime contract with the Pentagon that, should Weapon Able's production be curtailed, the U.S. Government would indemnify Baker, Inc. for loss of the contract and production. The indemnity would amount to an average of the profits derived in the best five years of Able production, and would cover a two-year "economic adjustment" period. That indemnity payment would come to $10 million. No severe dilemma there.

But, back in Caltex and a dozen other Weapon Able communities, workers are laid off. Unemployment insurance claim lines are long, but the workers will receive two-thirds of the state's average weekly wage for twenty-six weeks. If, after that time, they still haven't found work, they may get a thirteen-week extension of unemployment benefits.

The community fathers, businessmen and civic leaders rally somewhat from their initial shock. They form a local industrial development committee and hire a full-time director to (*1*) write federal grant applications for economic development assistance; and (*2*) recruit and scout prospective firms to buy or lease the Weapon Able plant and start producing widgets. The latter chore is called Operation Bootstrap.

Months pass, with the national unemployment rate hanging high at near 7 percent; in Caltex, it is now 14 percent. But undaunted, the local real estate broker comes up with an idea to level the old Weapon Able building, subdivide the 10-acre tract and sell lots for new condominiums, even though mortgage loan defaults are at an all-time high. The Chamber of Commerce proposes, instead, a city-financed industrial park. Its promotional literature stresses the advantages of a "free labor market." Local bankers suggest selling industrial development bonds, rather than directly charging local taxpayers for the park.

Unemployment compensation for the laid-off defense workers had expired after thirty-nine weeks. Therefore, when it was learned that Baker, Inc. had gone overseas and was now producing Weapon Able in Gomorrah, to secure that nation's defense against its arch rival, Sodom, the workers' international union applied for Trade Adjustment Assistance, which would have given them a two-year lease on life at 75 percent of pay. However, the Labor Department ruled that the loss of their jobs was unrelated to foreign trade.

After about a year, the Department of Defense's Office of Economic Adjustment announces it has approved

William Winpisinger is international president of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers.

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a $20,000 grant to survey the Caltex community and estimate its needs. The dozen other Weapon Able communities are not included in the survey; DoD's OEA lacks the money to assist *every* defense impacted community. And there's a little hitch at Caltex. OEA has asked the Economic Development Administration's Title IX section to administer the grant, and EDA's Title IX funds are committed through the next fiscal year. Caltex, though, is high on the list of priorities for F.Y. 1980.

Anyone remotely familiar with declining communities, whether in the agricultural Midwest, the heart of New York City, or under the leaden skies of New England, can finish the scenario. There is no happy ending to this tale of economic and social woe.

Several conclusions can be drawn from this fictitious but unexaggerated story of Weapon Able. The point that must first be recognized is that, until the fears of the nation's 2.5 million defense production workers in private industry can be constructively alleviated and their employment security assured, it may well be impossible to consider arms and military control measures and the defense budget on their merits. Indeed, since the economic recession of 1974-75, the ever escalating Pentagon budget has more and more been sold as a giant public works program, and less and less as an essential and rational national defense program.

Second, chronically high levels of unemployment aid and abet the cause of the Pentagon's big spenders. It is too much to expect that Congressmen and Senators will support defense budget cuts and resist unnecessary weapons procurement programs when the unemployment rate in their states or districts stands at punishing levels.

(It is noteworthy, though, in this connection, that several recent studies have shown that every $1 billion of direct federal spending in the civilian and nondefense public sectors of the economy produces more jobs than does $1 billion spent on defense. And some of those studies reputedly took into account payment of union-negotiated wages and benefits, the number of new civilian sector jobs created being calculated on the basis of union wage and benefit levels, rather than on the federal minimum wage. That is a consideration of primary importance, if trade unions are to be expected to support arms controls and Pentagon budget cuts. After all, if employers are entitled to million-dollar indemnity payments when defense production ceases, employees are entitled to new jobs at wage and benefit levels they've bargained for and depend upon. Unemployment compensation is not the goal of workers and their unions.)

Third, private enterprise cannot be trusted to relieve defense workers and their communities of their dilemma. Profit maximization does not run in tandem with either full employment or continuity of employment. Free-market dogma does not fit the defense industry, since it is wholly dependent on direct federal expenditures, for both production and research and development contracts. Competition is extremely slight in the industry.

It is fair to ask, however, after the contract expires, whether defense firms, particularly large prime contractors of the multinational stripe, have any moral, economic or social responsibilities to the workers and communities whom they've enlisted (drafted may be more appropriate) in serving the national interest for profit. Shouldn't society expect from business at least the same things business expects from the community and its workers—namely dependability, stability and fairness?

But if private business is to be absolved from accepting those responsibilities, then clearly the federal government has a duty to meet them. Defense work is required by the government in the name of the national interest. If it then curtails that work, it has a responsibility to pass measures and shape programs to make sure that workers and whole communities do not suffer as a consequence.

It follows, if defense workers are to have the freedom, which all other members of society enjoy, to decide objectively whether or not to support SALT, nuclear nonproliferation and weapons sales curbs, then the economic and military issues must be separated. That is where Planned Economic Conversion comes in.

Simply put, Planned Economic Conversion is a method to convert defense plant, equipment and workers to socially useful peacetime production. Beyond this, conceptual refinements are necessary. Planned Economic Conversion requires that notification be given in advance of an impending cutback or shutdown, so that a conversion plan can be developed *before* the ax falls. It requires, further, an assessment of local community needs and it requires stimulation of demand for civilian production by the declaration of a backlog of public needs.

Railroad rehabilitation, mass transit construction and manufacture, development of solar energy and other alternative energy sources, low-cost housing and solid waste recycling plants are critical and long-neglected public needs. Government-sponsored manufacture of the industrial goods necessary to meet them is the obvious key to successful economic conversion. These new industries would be located in those plants and communities crippled by defense cutbacks.

The Exploratory Project for Economic Alternatives, of Washington, D.C., recently outlined a program which showed that development of such industries would create more than 3 million new jobs. Literally thousands of these jobs would require the sophisticated skills now demanded by defense production, and more would require semi-skilled and unskilled employment.

Senators McGovern, Mathias and Cranston are now preparing economic conversion legislation. In the House, Representatives Weiss and Dodd are taking the initiative. Working with them to develop this legislation is a coalition of trade unions, peace groups, religious and public-interest organizations.

After thirty years of spiraling arms competition, it is evident that the only true guarantee of national security is a balanced foreign policy and a strong, diversified civilian economy operating at full employment. Defense spending can be cut back. With proper advanced planning, our national security and economic vitality will not be imperiled by that prudent step. On the contrary, they will be enhanced. □

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Does Disarmament Have a Future?

EARL C. RAVENAL

The arguments for disarmament are not bad. Nations—peoples—have an objective interest in a disarmed world, an interest they can't deny, or alienate, even by their negligent and irresponsible conduct. It is an especially urgent interest at this juncture, when we are living in a situation that strongly resembles the years before World War I: competitive armaments, regional antagonisms and irredentisms that give pretexts for aggression and conflict; unstable alliance systems opposing one another across still-tentative borders; profound social unrest and unmet domestic problems; the danger of mobilization and counter-mobilization, though now in the form of nuclear escalation. In such a climate, in 1914, "prudent" strategies of deterrence did not prevent war; they precipitated, accelerated, and expanded it.

Why have disarmament efforts failed? Why have they become objects of polite disdain in foreign policy-making circles, in the so-called "real world"? For this the peace people themselves are somewhat at fault. They persistently misconceived the problem of arms accumulation and war; they have fallen into the comforting habit of preaching to the converted. They still think that a reaffirmation of commitment, a redoubling of effort—perhaps in connection with an event such as the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD)—will unlock the problem.

In anticipation of UNSSOD, we have harvested the expected crop of hopeful and right-minded proposals, mostly from the governments of smaller countries and nongovernmental groups. More significantly, we have intimations that the larger governments will seek some relative national advantage from the session, or deflect the sentiment it inspires by advancing minuscule or anodyne proposals, or diffuse its concrete initiatives in endless discussion and parliamentary maneuvering.

Actually, the follow-up to UNSSOD must be its most important phase. And, though the session is obviously intended to generate multilateral action, its most important products will be the independent initiatives of individual nations, and the pressures that domestic and transnational groups put on the leaders of such nations. If UNSSOD does not result in some concrete *national* actions, it will have been just another rhetorical feast, followed by the usual international hangover and the usual bromides.

A bibliography on arms control and disarmament, currently on sale, lists more than 9,000 entries—analyses, discussions, appeals, polemics and blueprints. Whatever is wrong with disarmament, it is not a shortage of proposals. If the political prospects for disarmament now are poor, there are intellectual reasons: the logical basis for disarmament is not clear; past rationales are out of touch with current international circumstances; they have been overtaken by technology. What are some of the specific problems?

Comparative Utopias. Disarmament proposals have relied abjectly on the assumption of a universal international organization—virtually a world government—that would subordinate national governments and dispose of central military forces. Architects of disarmament proposals have spent much of their time detailing frameworks for global collective decision making, provisions for the transfer of military power by states to international authority, and blueprints for world police forces.

The fault has been to underestimate the stubborn longevity of the nation-state. True, most of them are porous as sieves, and incompetent, but they will be the source of foreign policy decision making for the foreseeable future.

This need not be an occasion for despair. Impressive measures of peace have been achieved by independent states. Nations have negotiated stringent limits on arms, and have actually destroyed considerable stores of their own major military equipment (viz., the Washington Naval Treaties of 1922 that limited the battleships of the five great naval powers). They have also devised serious restraints on the conduct of war (viz., The Hague conferences at the turn of the century, and the Geneva Conventions between the World Wars). Nations have even agreed to outlaw war entirely as an instrument of policy, as in the Treaty of Paris (the "Kellogg-Briand Treaty") of 1928. And nations for long periods of time have had very low levels of armaments—from one-tenth to one-twentieth of what they maintain now.

Nor does the persistence of national sovereignty mean giving up on "general and complete disarmament." On the contrary, it should be seen as a reason for accomplishing the partial steps of arms control, and as a standard against which each such move can be measured. The high-water mark of general and complete disarmament is the September 1961 McCloy-Zorin "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles" and the 1962 draft treaties by the United States and the Soviet Union. These statements are useful precedents, evidence of an underlying will of nations to countenance comprehensive disarmament, and even a glimpse of its technical feasibility. On the other hand, they must be seen as largely hypothetical schemes of no real strategic intent—a warning to contemporary disarmament strategists that a simple return to the formulas of sixteen years ago could mean another exercise in finely crafted illusions. McCloy-Zorin and the U.S.-Soviet draft treaties, with their initial promise and their exemplary faults, should be taken as points of departure.

The principal problem with the 1961-62 drafts is that they posit as the final stage of disarmament the virtually complete dismantling of military forces, weapons and

Earl Ravenal, a former official in the office of the Secretary of Defense, is now a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C. and a professor of American foreign policy at Georgetown School of Foreign Service and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is author or co-author of four books on international relations and foreign and military policy.

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defense budgets. At the end of this process, a supranational U.N. agency is to be the sole remaining repository of forces and weapons that could be used for more than internal defense. An appropriate agreement for our day, one more skeptical of achieving world government, would have to allow correspondingly higher residual forces and a more permissive definition of "internal order," "safeguarding of frontiers" and other tasks. In the probable circumstances of the future, disarmament would be pursued down to forces that could not feasibly conduct aggressive war against other nations, but that would allow nations to defend their citizens and their property against external attack.

A Grain of SALT. A second flaw in past disarmament proposals is that they have assumed that progress will come only through multilateral or bilateral bargaining and formal agreements among nations. The emphasis has been on draftsmanship and legalism. This ignores the potential of independent, national, informal moves to disarm and to defuse war. Indeed, in many important areas of disarmament, the only effective moves might be independent. Peace doesn't have to be formal, binding, comprehensive, or neat. It can be achieved in patches, wherever and however possible.

We should adopt a multilevel approach, including multilateral, bilateral, national and transnational forums and measures. Multilateral forums can be ones such as the U.N. Special Session. Partial multilateral conferences and organizations, such as the "club" of nuclear powers, or the suppliers of nuclear facilities and technology, or the countries of a region, can also contribute.

Bilateral negotiations such as SALT should also be supported, but we shouldn't put all our eggs in that basket. We are not likely, in the next few rounds of SALT, to exact from the Soviet Union sufficient cuts in their arsenal of heavy, increasingly accurate, MIRV intercontinental ballistic missiles (their SS-18s) to protect our own fixed land-based missiles (Minuteman). And the Russians, for their part, will be unable to reverse the formidable U.S. capability for counterforce strikes. We need to hedge against the insufficiency of the SALT negotiations by making certain independent moves that are within our own competence, such as phasing out our land-based missiles as they become vulnerable to advances in Soviet weaponry.

Transnational, nongovernmental institutions, such as professional associations and religious groups, will be needed, to prepare a receptive climate for serious reductions and other initiatives, and to put restraints on national governments. In addition to working in all such forums, we must be active in all the weapons areas: strategic nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, "peaceful" nuclear technology, conventional arms and arms transfers, including instruments of repression.

Finally, we must control warlike activity in all the ways available: quantitative limits on numbers of weapons or total explosive power; qualitative restrictions on weapons systems and on research, development and testing; nonproliferation safeguards such as inspection and monitoring of nuclear materials and facilities; geographical restrictions such as nuclear-weapon-free zones or general zones of peace; limits on military budgets; doctrinal changes (for example, no first use of nuclear weapons, and limitations on targeting and other attempts to spare noncombatants); legal strictures that reinforce personal accountability and help alter attitudes toward military actions and preparations.

Playing the Numbers Game. Past disarmament proposals have been preoccupied with the numbers of warheads, delivery vehicles and other manifestations of military power. It is often assumed that numbers in themselves cause instability and war. (This is a curious mirror-image of the hawks, who think that numbers win or lose wars.) All of it ignores the question: how do wars start? Would any nation be crazy enough to start a nuclear war? Only if it thought the other side was about to strike first—and if it thought it could prevent the other side from striking first.

Therefore, people ought to take more interest in the stability of the strategic balance, and in the context of that balance nations, and ultimately peoples, must have incentives to disarm. At least, at all stages, they must be spared overwhelming fears for their own security. Each stage of disarmament must be more secure than the situation that would otherwise prevail.

Looking for the Gordian Knot. Most previous disarmament efforts have stressed trust and good will, as if those are the primary—or even the only—factors that have been lacking. They seek to cut some Gordian knot with an immediate and comprehensible stroke of exhortation. But trust and good will are not enough. Trust must be founded on the technical and logical conditions of strategic stability. In a nuclear age, strategic stability is almost synonymous with peace.

Therefore, the peace people have to be as expert as the hawks; they must be able to hold their ground in debates that turn on technical characteristics and effects of weapons. It is new technology that has made the nuclear balance brittle again, and brought calculations of counterforce into fashion. For a decade and a half, in a situation now castigated by many as "Mutual Assured Destruction," there was effective mutual vulnerability. With dispersed single-warhead missiles on each side, and with relatively low accuracies, combined with relatively small throw weights and yields, the advantage lay with the defender, or the retaliator. An aggressor could *lose* by starting a nuclear war (in a sense even more obvious than the fact that "no one wins"). Now, with MIRVs and with more precise accuracies, greater throw weights and higher yields, the advantage has reverted to the attacker, and first counterforce strikes are again at least thinkable. Therefore, tangible corrections will be required—reductions and changes in weapons and force structures, not just expressions of good will.

Misplacing the problem leads to misconceiving the answer. Many peace people are quick to cry "pathology" or "malevolence," and some day, no doubt, the present accumulation and use of arms will be regarded as madness. But it is madness of a very special kind. It has to do with the convoluted, but genuine, quest for "national security." Therefore, "curing" individuals, even if this were possible, would not be an effective remedy. Dis-

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armament proposals must treat "national security" as a real problem, not an aberration.

Something for Everybody. Previous proposals for disarmament have been self-deluding about their effects. They assumed that disarmament would bring all good things in its train—peace, order, justice and prosperity. These expectations are nice, but soft. When reasonable predictions demonstrate that it can't all come true, the whole case fails. Some realism at the start would be more helpful. Disarmament is worth the costs, but there will be some. For example, the restraint of nuclear weapons by some nations (particularly the principal "guarantor" nations) may encourage the proliferation of nuclear arms throughout the international system. Restraints on transfers of conventional arms may lead to the development of national arms production capabilities. Abolition of the "alliance system" may lead to the acquisition by other nations of independent means of defense—to a "Gaullist world." The United States may lose its influence on other nations and have to resign itself to accepting other regimes, the bad along with the good, forfeiting even the ability to bring about "justice" by intrusion or coercion.

In making the case for disarmament, peace people must be tough-minded and responsible. But "tough-minded" has nothing to do with the attitude of the hawks; it means being honest about the trade-offs and the balance of risks. And "responsible" has nothing to do with the compromised and stultified positions of the foreign policy establishment; it means accepting the consequences of our own proposals.

Ranging over the array of disarmament initiatives, one sees that most of them can be made independently, by the United States alone, even if it would be preferable to achieve reciprocity from other significant powers such as the Soviet Union.

Independent national initiatives are widely misunderstood and somewhat distrusted, but they have an important, and at times critical, function. They are designed to reduce the risks and burdens of military postures and doctrines. They can create momentum for the disarmament process and indicate the scope of possibilities. They can generate public and even elite support, transforming the climate in which disarmament might proceed. The insistence on independent moves within a framework of comprehensive disarmament is not a contradiction but a recognition of reality and actually an unconditional commitment to progress in arms reduction and war avoidance.

Eliminate the Counterforce Threat. One way that the United States could begin to reduce its forces independently, and in the process enhance its own security and the stability of the strategic balance, would be to phase out our intercontinental ballistic missiles. Anyone who understands the technical factors—types of weapons, their location, their characteristics and effects—must take seriously the contention of the hawks that certain portions of our nuclear forces will become vulnerable, by the early to mid-1980s, to a Russian first strike. SALT II—or any probable SALT III or IV—will not solve the problem. What can we do about it? Independently, without asking or being asked by the Russians, we could (*1*) eliminate our own provocative counterforce capability, and (*2*) eliminate our vulnerability to a Soviet counterforce strike.

Our own counterforce capability rests heavily on the potent (350 kiloton) MK-12A warhead and the superaccurate (within one-tenth of a mile) NS-20 guidance system that we are already introducing into our Minuteman force. These two improvements, fitted onto the present 550 Minuteman III missiles, could threaten Soviet missiles in their silos, thereby needling the Russians in a crisis to launch their missiles pre-emptively. Their decision to do so would be reinforced by the fact that our improved Minuteman would still be a stationary target; in short, our land-based force would have the worst combination of characteristics: provocation and vulnerability.

As for vulnerability, some propose to eliminate it by moving to the M-X system—that is, putting our missiles in a big subway system, moving them back and forth in 20-mile tunnels. And indeed, mobility is the least objectionable feature of the proposed M-X system. The arguments against "going mobile" with M-X are its extreme cost (estimated at close to $50 billion to deploy about 300 missiles); its provocative and destabilizing effects because of its high MIRV-carrying capability (up to fourteen warheads); the relatively high yield of each warhead (about 200 kilotons), and their projected accuracy (within 100 yards); the fact that the M-X, even in its mobile or multiple basing mode, would still be vulnerable to a high expenditure of Soviet warheads; and, not least, the fact that there is an obvious alternative—the complete elimination of our land-based missile force, over the next five or ten years, as it becomes vulnerable to improvements in the Soviet missile force.

Some would say that we should use this weapons system (and indeed every item of our defense policy) as a bargaining chip against the Russians. But should our entire defense policy depend on how the Russians feel about it? Independent moves should be more than bargaining ploys, so much psychological bait, to be canceled if not reciprocated. They should make strategic sense in themselves, so that they can be sustained whether or not they are reciprocated. In the most general sense, the purpose of independent national moves is to *disconnect* our security from "the Soviet threat."

No First Use of Nuclear Weapons. Perhaps the most important move toward a less dangerous world is for nations to build into their defensive plans an intention not to use nuclear weapons first. President Carter's address to the U.N. on October 4, 1977, was no change from our traditional doctrine. We are still relying on a nuclear response to redeem a losing conventional battle. Our present policy is a prescription for converting regional defense into global holocaust.

We should move to a doctrine of no first use, even independently and unconditionally, because it would enhance our own security and the stability of the world strategic balance. Our homeland, cities, population, property, political system, civil arrangements, social structures—everything we have—can be destroyed only if we invite an enemy's direct attack. We have every strategic, as well as moral, reason to adopt a no first-use doctrine.

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"Tac Nucs" and Neutrons. Tactical nuclear weapons also ought to be subject to some independent national initiatives. Employed within a "theatre," such as Western Europe, and generally on or relatively close to the battlefield, they present a special problem in the prevention of war. Although ostensibly designed for attack on military objectives, they are a bridge between conventional warfare and intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons and thus open up the possibility of global conflict.

Many aspects of tactical nuclear weapons arise in the debate about the introduction of the "neutron bomb" into the U.S. arsenal in Europe. A device that kills by enhanced radiation, rather than blast or heat, it is said to be particularly effective against tanks and armored personnel vehicles. Since, unlike other tactical nuclear weapons, its radiation is massive but short-lived, enemy areas attacked with the neutron bomb or shell would soon be available for occupation.

The danger is not that this weapon won't do what it is supposed to do; rather, that it might do it too well. If we were already in a conventional war, our own initial use of these nuclear weapons would be more than probable, leading almost inevitably to all-out nuclear warfare. Further development and deployment of the neutron weapon should be canceled, but it is typical of the "improvements" of tactical nuclear weapons that will constantly be sought as long as this category of arms is relied on to fill a "gap" in the spectrum of warfare and deterrence. We should grasp the larger problem of tactical nuclear weapons and consider their elimination from all theatres, including Europe, and ultimately from our stockpiles as part of a more general phased program of disarmament.

Other Independent Moves. Several other areas of disarmament lend themselves to independent national initiatives. Pending a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, we could impose upon ourselves an indefinite moratorium. We now have a significant lead in the aspects of nuclear technology that are proved in such tests. We also have enough lead in the flight testing of improved missiles to declare an independent moratorium on that activity. Bilateral reciprocity might or might not ensue, but we would lose little, if anything, by the effort.

Still another independent move would be for the United States to observe nuclear-weapon-free zones or, more broadly, zones of peace established by regional nations, such as the nuclear-weapon-free zone declared for Latin America in the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, or the zone of peace proposed for the Indian Ocean.

We could also impose more rigid standards of war crimes upon our own leaders. There will be no lasting progress in curtailing war until responsibility is fixed at the level of the genesis of all human action: the will and conscience of the individual person. Emphasis on strict morality and legal responsibility would revoke the Niebuhrian double standard that postulates one realm for the individual (traditional Christian morality) and another for the statesman (an amoral world). The consequences of this two-tier ethic have been undeclared wars, covert political actions, assassinations, destabilizations of lawful and popular regimes, secrecy in government, deception of citizens, and arrogation of war powers by the Executive.

Areas Not Amenable to Independent Initiatives. Some measures—particularly mechanisms for confidence building and peace keeping—are hardly susceptible to independent national actions. Vital as they are to a scheme of disarmament, they require multilateral agencies, such as the United Nations or at least regional groupings. Peace keeping is one of the conditions for inducing the disarmament of the larger powers and the dismantling of the opposing military alliance systems. The present "guarantors" must have the assurance that a local conflict will be contained short of the point where they would "have to" become involved.

The Special Problem of Proliferation. The spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and conventional arms is not so much an area of clear opportunity for disarmament as it is an embarrassing, even a poignant, trade-off against measures of disarmament that would otherwise be indisputably desirable. We have to recognize nuclear proliferation not as a technical problem in itself but as an aspect of the emerging many-power world. Indeed, the tendency to fragmentation of military power and political initiative has been exacerbated by the decline of American reliability, both as an alliance guarantor and as a supplier of critical resources, in this case nuclear fuel. Thus, further steps to curtail American power through disarmament might, as a side effect, contribute to further nuclear proliferation. This will be true despite any countervailing exemplary effect of American self-restraint in the development of nuclear arms and nuclear energy.

Nevertheless, things can be done, some independently, some cooperatively, to impede the process. Some examples: developing restrictions within the London Supplier Group on the transfer of nuclear technology, strengthening the inspection and monitoring powers of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and inventing improvements in the nuclear fuel cycle.

Disarmament, however substantial, is not an end in itself. It must be shaped by a larger vision of security. For thirty years the United States has operated under a national security theory that can be described in two key terms: deterrence and alliance. Unless it is fundamentally altered, we are condemned to periodic exercises of "brinkmanship" (credibility-enhancing confrontations), such as Cuba in 1962 and the Middle East in 1973; to periodic "limited wars," such as Korea and Vietnam, and to the hovering threat of global nuclear confrontation. It has been said that "deterrence works." It works, that is, until it fails. And then, because of the exaggerated retaliatory postures that have been adopted by both sides "to strengthen deterrence," destruction is vastly aggravated. And alliances serve as transmission belts and amplifiers of regional conflict. The cult of deterrence and the alliance system should, therefore, be replaced with a counter-theory of war avoidance and self-reliance.

Such a fundamentally altered foreign policy need not proceed from the premise that the "other side" is up to nothing. It may be true that other nations are doing things that are not altogether benign. If we admit the probability of some troublesome behavior by others, and

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still want to obtain the benefits of a revised security system, we may have to ask some more basic questions. They will be "so-what" questions, "can-we-live-with-that" questions. To answer them, we will have to overturn some notions that have been considered almost self-evident, such as the value of a military balance—not whether we are currently enjoying such a balance but whether we need a military balance at all. Finite strategic sufficiency, at each stage of disarmament, is a valid and respectable condition; but the quest for balance is more likely to result in unending competition and, paradoxically, to perpetual instability.

We will also have to ask, not what "security" means but rather *whose* security is at stake. There can be no "national security"—or "national interest," for that matter—apart from the security and the interests of a nation's citizens. We need a concept of "civil security." The "we" that is traditionally invoked by elites must be taken apart, and the real consensus must be found. True, the public gives off confusing signals, but by and large, if faced with a stark choice, citizens don't want to risk being consumed in a nuclear fireball or poisoned by radioactive debris in order to enhance their government's influence on the conduct of other nations.

"Realism" and "responsibility" are words bandied about with some emotion in the current debate on national security. A disarmament program such as that proposed here is intended to be appropriate to the conditions of a future international system, and to make those conditions more favorable to the continuation of human life and civilization. Such a program would seem to be realistic, in the most precise as well as the most fundamental sense. Nevertheless, the very proposal of substantial disarmament is so far from the present agenda of the principal nations that it courts charges of extremism, irresponsibility, and fantasy.

But there is such a thing as the extremism of the Center, the ultimate irresponsibility of the sober elites. All too commonly it is said that the circumstances of the nuclear age have discredited the civilized values that have evolved over centuries. But those are the values that lead to survival, and the "statesmanship" that has been developed to suit a nuclear age has been precisely contrary to the probability of survival in a nuclear age. When putting forth proposals for disarmament we must not neglect the "risks." But there is a *choice* of risks, and we should not be afraid to make our commitments and investments on the side of peace. □

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Bigness

THE OVERDEVELOPED NATIONS: The Diseconomies of Scale. *By Leopold Kohr. Schocken Books. 184 pp. $9.95.*

ROBERT ENGLER

"We do things in a big way in the United States," Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. of General Motors explained in 1963. "I have always believed in planning big, and I have always discovered after the fact that, if anything, we didn't plan big enough." Growth and progress go hand in hand and "there is no resting place." But size is no barrier, "only a problem of management." President John Kennedy understood: the nation's problems were essentially administrative. Panicked by the Soviet sputnik and then set back in Cuba, the United States was to take off for the moon and beyond. "We choose to go to the moon," he proclaimed in 1962, "because it is there." A lunar landing would "organize and measure the best of our energies and skills." We did not intend to founder in the backwash of the coming age of space. "We mean to lead it."

Corporate and political leaders had no doubts about their ability to orchestrate the emerging global economy. Problems such as unemployment, urban decay and political disaffection could be remedied by an expanding gross national product, improved administration and awakened conscience. Business schools and public policy programs promised techniques and managers to keep the system running. One executive of a late-booming state university exulted: "We are on our way to being the General Electric of higher education." Meanwhile, cities spread their boundaries, family farms went under. Corporations became conglomerates and the welfare and warfare functions of public government multiplied. For less developed and hungry regions abroad a technological fix was prescribed as the road to well-being. A green revolution powered by petrochemicals and delivered by international business would insure the magical modernization. When the United States backed off from helping Egypt build the Aswan High Dam, the Soviet Union, which shared so many of the premises about growth, stepped in with financial and technical assistance. The labels changed from "cold war" to "détente" but an arms competition between the two giants continued to envelop the world.

There were scattered voices during the 1950s and early 1960s which deplored the cultural homogeneity brought by global integration and denied that an expansionist technology necessarily would improve the daily lives of many. Leopold Kohr's was one of these. Born in Austria, Kohr taught at Rutgers and the University of Puerto Rico before becoming an extramural tutor in political philosophy at the University College of Wales in Aberystwyth where he now lives. His study, *The Overdeveloped Nations*, was published more than twenty years ago in Europe where it and a predecessor volume, *The Breakdown of Nations* (London, 1957), enjoyed recognition in the alternate technology underground and among those troubled by the celebration of unlimited growth through superpower sponsorship. One finds that such contemporary critics as Ivan Illich and the late E.F. Schumacher are indebted in both reasoning and language to Kohr. The book now makes its first appearance in the United States.

The basic theme, with seeds in such sources as Aristotle, Mill, Kropotkin, Gandhi and Brandeis, is deliberately and deceptively simple. It centers around the claim that the analysis of social phenomena can be reduced to a common denominator—a theory of critical size. Since man and not society is the measure of all things, human happiness is the appropriate test of social policy. Once institutions outgrow a scale which might preserve that focus they become cancerous. Bigness is the fundamental cause of misery and the nation-state the most troubling example.

Humans form society, Kohr argues, for convivial reasons. To liberate time from work so that they can find companionship in the pub and the church, it becomes essential to increase productivity through some specialization. Exchanging of goods and services introduces complexities and disputes which in turn create a need for political functions by agents who will administer justice and preserve the peace. (He suggests, with a touch reminiscent of Veblen, that the publican presiding over debate may have been the first full-time public official.) Such needs could be met by a cluster of villages and small cities, each of which provides the desired functions in harmony with the human scale, and which together constitute a flourishing political state. For the fullest good life, "culture" is also essential. Hence the concept of optimal social size must be extended to encourage poets, composers, artists and scholars. A society of up to 200,000 should invite the taverns, churches, factories, markets, theatres, galleries and universities supportive of Aristotle's *summum bonum*. After all, the "retarded intimacy" of small and relatively slow-moving communities once produced Aristotle, Shakespeare, Newton, Goethe, Dante, Botticelli and Mozart. Could one ask for more?

Given modern communications technology and the expanded administrative vision it allows, Kohr concedes that decentralized populations of 12 million to 15 million are possible without adversely affecting a nation's optimum performance. But the dangers of excess size require continuing constraint. Nature, he reminds, puts a stop to the growth of things once they have become large enough to fulfill their functions. Ancient Greece, which contributed so richly to Western ideals, had its political instincts finely attuned to the question of the most favorable size. But neither Keynesian liberalism nor Marxian socialism is disposed to worry about scale. Yet once wise limits are exceeded, the overgrown state develops "organization men" at the expense of free ones. Policies are justified in the name of the power of the society rather than the happiness of individuals. Diversity becomes a luxury and collectivism inevitable, as does the social discipline that must follow. Government, once banished from the economic arena by advocates of private initiative, is summoned back to bring order. Most new effort is designed to deal with the disfunctioning of the expanded system.

Robert Engler, professor of political science at the City University of New York, is author of The Politics of Oil: Private Power and Democratic Directions *and also the recently published* The Brotherhood of Oil: Energy Policy and the Public Interest *(both from the University of Chicago Press).*

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Such societies accept no limits in size and radius of impact. The larger the institution the better, and the goal of a world state is viewed as the pinnacle of human accomplishment. "Why the farmer in his cottage, the fisherman by the pond, the father playing with his child, the poet admiring nature, the worker enjoying his beer, should require it in their pursuit of happiness is, however, another question."

The answer? Devolution and decentralization. Disunion now, insists the author who, incidentally, is a Welsh nationalist. Scotland and Cornwall should also savor regional autonomy. "And for good measure loosen up and federalize even England herself." The Common Market should be dissolved into a more loosely linked free trading system based on regional markets composed of units of the ancient states that have been absorbed into each of the great European nations. Federal arrangements should be developed wherever possible. For overgrown states and their economies bring devastating cyclical disruptions, unemployment and parasitic bureaucracies. Smaller and more manageable nations may not end aggression but the impact of their behavior as licensed predators may be lessened. Develop tools which strengthen individual competence and communal diversity rather than machines which mold people into ever-larger collectives. Placing limits on growth will make possible self-regulation rather than concentrated control, thus restoring healthier balances.

Supporting evidence for Kohr's thesis now comes from many quarters. A supertanker smashes and the people of Brittany pay the immediate price for a technology where seaworthiness is not the primary calculation. The ecological disaster following the building of the Aswan High Dam reopens discussion about the preferability of a series of smaller dams. In the United States challenges to institutions which develop stakes in the problems they were created to solve are commonplace. Costs and privileges of a health industry spiral in the name of progress, but actual improvement in the health of the citizenry is less clear. A top-heavy educational bureaucracy, more successful in training people to march to the beat of giant institutional drums than in fostering intellectual discipline and moral autonomy, insists that the answer to our difficulties is more education. Insatiable consumption of luxury goods by a minority of the earth's population is fostered by corporations whose growth accelerates movement of capital, resources and technology across national boundaries with minimum heed for transformations in the character of work, community or environment. A permanent military establishment perpetuates a concept of national security which protects neither the freedom nor the security of citizens. A federal government becomes so unwieldy in its efforts to compensate for the imbalances of a bloated society that responsibility becomes elusive to the governors and the governed. Sixty years after the revolution a Russian hierarchy appears insusceptible to a withering away or a dismantling within the foreseeable future.

That human-scale settings are preferable is incontrovertible, at least to this reviewer. Locally baked bread tastes better than its packaged replacement. A solar future is more hopeful than a capital-devouring nuclear one. One seeks schools whose size encourages sensitivity to individuals and nations which lack the means to obliterate neighbors. One wants leaders within the reach of reason and policies open to debate and review. Shoestring operations such as listener-supported radio station WBAI and the weekly *In These Times* offer more serious coverage and thoughtful interpretation of news than do the media goliaths with their million-dollar technologies and personalities.

The issue to be addressed, Kohr contends, is changing the size of society,

"A controversial book of major importance"*



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Paul Newman

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

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not the mode of production. But his thesis about scale does not always explain why some nations accelerate in growth and why there is unequal development within countries. Is the tendency to expand rooted in technology? One misses in Kohr the incisiveness of Veblen's appraisal of an integrated industrial system. Nor does he deal with human intelligence as perhaps the critical factor creating increasing order and organization, a theme powerfully advanced by Roderick Seidenberg in *Posthistoric Man*. Or is the need to grow inherent in capitalism, as Harry Magdoff suggests, with new technologies providing the means for concentration? Big tankers are built not because of technological determinism (admittedly, there is the temptation) but because of profit calculations.

Some functions appear to require large-scale guidelines and organization if justice is to be done. Will "Balkanization" provide future generations with greater protection of the seabeds? Are calls for a new international economic order and world planning for the just distribution of resources primarily rhetoric? Does democratic social control inevitably evolve into tyranny? One must respect Kohr's warning that big institutions carry the potential for big mischief and manipulation of people's lives and that any controls must be grounded federally in their needs and their will. But his solution appears to bypass the more difficult, perhaps insurmountable, political task of learning how to make power accountable, whatever the scale. Indeed at times he uses the terms "size" and "power" as though they were interchangeable. Yet his case often is more telling when related to "power."

Attacks upon big government, without informed alternatives, become the platforms of politicians who build careers as executioners in the service of the present power structure, competing with pledges to cut social services designed to offer people minimum relief from the failings of an industrial juggernaut. Instead of waiting for experts and the feds, communities will have to hammer out strategies for employment, energy and other policies which might preserve their livelihoods and identities and define their interest in national and larger arenas. They will have to mobilize political consciousness to do battle with entrenched forces which have a stake, not in the abstraction of bigness but in the specific institutions which have always equated might with progress and privilege with right.

The Overdeveloped Nations undoubtedly will be cited for its telling irreverences. A comment directed toward the British could well apply to current occupants of the White House: "No longer able to administer sound military beatings, [they] are gradually convincing themselves that they are beating the world in political wisdom and moral leadership. Yet, anyone with political wisdom knows that no country on earth has ever taken the slightest notice of anybody's claim to moral leadership unless there was indisputable evidence that the claimant could beat it up also physically." But it will be unfortunate if Kohr's appeal for the virtue of the small will be dismissed as romantic and irrelevant. For while the text is modest-sized, in keeping with its spirit, and critics will find inadequacies in the central argument, the crises of the Western political economy and the nation-state system suggest that the burden of proof more properly belongs upon the defenders of thinking big. □

CABO SAN LUCAS

The world ends here. Why else, this far south,
would the desert give way so slowly
then lose itself to the ocean's sullen mouth,
to miles of water indeterminate as sky.

Here, even the dying must come hard.
I rest near the point, safe from the steady hiss
of waves and watch the diving frigate birds,
their beaks curving toward the dark forms of fish.

As far as I can see, the sand glows bitter
as quartzite. What I've already lost dulls
what I can hold. The rest stays hidden
from this brittle light that burns us all.

Andrew Grossbardt

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THEATRE/Harold Clurman

"The joint is jumpin' on Broadway," is how an ad for *Ain't Misbehavin'*, the Fats Waller musical show at the Longacre Theatre, reads. It is one of the very few examples of entirely accurate publicity. There is more animation in the occasion than in anything ever devised by the producers of our film cartoons. And a lot more vitality.

Not all the numbers were written by Fats Waller, but all were recorded by him. The dates of composition extend from 1929 to 1943. Whether the tunes or lyrics were the work of black or white authors, they all unanimously share in joyousness of spirit.

Bright or "blue," they are informed by a zest that arises from an embrace of existence on all levels, high and low! Whatever their musicological derivation, their effect is spiritual; they affirm life. Their energy or kinetic power is not mechanical but soulful.

I never knew many of the thirty songs listed on the program. I may therefore be mistaken in the detail of their verbal or musical quality. The fact is I could not make out all the words. The intrinsic value of the music may be a matter of dispute; the vocalization may at times contravene classically accepted canons. No matter: we are carried away, caught in a warmly festive whirl. The occasion is more than exhilarating, it is endearing: it causes a kind of exultation rare even in "legitimate" entertainments.

The medium is above all *theatre*. For good as the songs may be, they would not affect us as they do if it were not for the five actors who deliver them—and the man at the piano and musical supervisor, Luther Henderson. They and Arthur Faria, who staged the numbers, and the director, Richard Maltby, Jr. (who conceived the show in collaboration with Murray Horwitz), make a more integrated ensemble than anything now on a New York stage.

The wonderful interrelation among the players is not a matter of excellence in stage craftsmanship or thoroughgoing rehearsal but the product of blood and environmental kinship. For they appear to be of one body, a single impulse unifies them in absolute coordination. Each actor, while distinctly individual, functions as a limb of one organism. The "beat" is the throb of a common center, one heart! That is what I mean when I speak of the show as essentially theatre. All the show's elements become a whole through performance, through acting.

If the words had been in a foreign language unknown to me my reaction would have been pretty much the same. One sees, hears, senses the significance of the total phenomenon. In such a presentation I hesitate to single out the various participants. Yet I must do so because each "part" possesses his or her own look, sound, personality.

A wicked raciness is everywhere present, and with it purity: a total lack of apology for exuberance gives everything done or implied—naughty or nice—an unimpeachable human validity, a basic health. In Nell Carter we find the most sophisticated knowingness about the "sins" of our urban life, white and black. It is there in her half-closed, shaded eyes, the piercing kazoo-toned voice with a register no single instrument can achieve, the unabashed supercynical swagger proclaims or insinuates the whole "story" underlying the numbers. Andre De Shields is the protean showman, delightful rascal, constant kidder, devil-may-care playboy. Armelia McQueen is the roly-poly "vamp" and full-bodied tease, a delicately mirthful come-on to pleasures everywhere prized. Ken Page, a pillar of strength, promises sense and stability and his projection of *I Hate You 'Cause Your Feet's Too Big* is a masterpiece of jocular scorn. For awhile I took the newcomer in the cast Charlaine Woodard to be a creature drawn

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
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by Walt Disney, a kind of superdoll on jiggling wires in which every feature shines as if illuminated from within by a battery of a thousand-watt force; but then she sang several subdued lyrics with a special tenderness.

I saw *Ain't Misbehavin'* when it was initiated at the "cabaret" section of the Manhattan Theatre Club, when the tiny playing area restricted the possibilities of free movement and broad effects. I was afraid that the show might lose its good-pal intimacy in the two-balcony house on Broadway. But though more lines are lost at the Longacre, the show has gained through John Lee Beatty's adept stage arrangement, the just-right gaiety of Randy Barcelo's costumes and the fitting colors of Pat Collins's lighting, in addition to the very helpful services of a small and expert band. □

ART

LAWRENCE ALLOWAY

San Francisco

In twenty years there have been four opportunities to see Clyfford Still's paintings. In 1959, the Albright-Knox Art Gallery, Buffalo, exhibited the core of a bequest of thirty-one works by the artist to the museum. In 1963, the Institute of Contemporary Art, at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, showed thirty-two more paintings, and in 1969 the Marlborough Gallery showed a large group of works purchased from the artist, his only New York appearance in the period. In 1975, Still presented twenty-eight paintings to the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. Each of these groups, controlled by the artist absolutely, covers at least two decades of work.

The Philadelphia and New York exhibitions were of course temporary and the Buffalo group is not usually on view in any number. Thus San Francisco is the only place with a consultable body of Still's paintings, and as such is of exceptional importance. The museum space is limited, so the problem was to make the paintings available without eating up too many galleries. The solution is an adaptation of the multiple hinged walls of the Sir John Soane Museum, London, which open out to reveal a second, recessed level of hanging. At San Francisco four big panels swing out 90 degrees into the gallery: their backs and the recessed areas triple the front-face area of the walls. The first effect of the room, when the walls are closed, is of a well of Stills; the second, opened up, of a labyrinth of Stills.

To stand in the T.B. Walker Gallery, with twenty of the paintings in the San Francisco group, is a rare opportunity as well as an exhilarating experience. It is too early to evaluate the meaning of all the dates based on the artist's own periodic releases of information, including early paintings not seen publicly before, but the caliber of the work is not in doubt. The first of Still's large horizontal paintings in San Francisco (they are usually about 9½ feet high by 13) is an untitled work (No. 19 in the catalogue) dated 1951-52. A dominant expanse of red is split vertically by tapering or stepped black or gray forms. The paint, as always in Still, is applied with a palette knife, a tool unusual at this scale.

The track of the knife, as it presses the moist paint against the canvas, is insistently directional. On the other hand, the effect of large monochrome color areas is to expand optically in the spectator's eye: the weight of the paint and color as light constitute a dialectic of materiality and visual opulence.

The repeated ridges of paint produced by the knife account for the "ugliness" that early writers on Still were sensitive to, but they do not seem ugly now. (Ugliness is an ephemeral criterion.) In a 1957 painting (No. 25) of proportions similar to No. 19 the dominant color is yellow, despite some rips and edges of other hues. The blazing paint actually consists of two different yellows interpenetrating across the wide surface: the modification is hidden, so to say, within the bright plane of color. It is a subtle mix of the overbearing (all that yellow) and the nuanced (the rippling internal diversification of hue).

Still's use of the palette knife can be seen as a solution to the problem of how to put down large areas of a few colors, sometimes only one, and animate them visually without resorting to touching up. This was an important matter to painters of Still's generation, aware of European models in art but determined to subvert them by American characteristics. To use palette-knife strokes, with their methodical character and their variation, was a brilliant technical decision. They are varied in length and curvature; they deposit on the canvas a hard edge at the initial point of contact and a grazed or blurred one as the paint runs out at the end of a stroke. Especially in the later works, Still does not impact these strokes or run them together: a kind of monotony is produced by similar fluttery marks occupying large stretches of canvas. On one hand, therefore, Still's technique is manually diverse and sensuous; on the other, it is restrained and mechanical. He is able to give a sober, "American" harshness to the play of paint, certainly desired by the artist to judge from his statements, but without obliterating the internal vivacity of incident in each work. The great stretched areas of color are alive with naturally occurring variations.

It may seem roundabout to go to San Francisco to discover the value of the palette knife to an Abstract Expressionist painter, but in the context of Still there is a point to it. Criticism of him rests almost entirely on the first impressions of writers in the 1950s or on Still's lofty view of himself. In a statement in the catalogue of the San Francisco bequest, for instance, he refers to himself as "one who dared challenge the arrogant farce enacted by those responsible for the intellectual corruption perpetrated during the last four decades in the name of art, criticism, and history." He observes that the artist is "expected to perpetrate the values of his contemporaries," but "I would not relinquish my identity to the security of the historical myth." Proud words, separating Still from the mire of the world and the habits of history, but if it is pride that enables him to work copiously on a large scale, so be it.

It is not my intention to separate the artist's intentions from the work and to view the paintings purely formally. However, given the shortage of Still's paintings until now, and given the lack of specifics in the discussion of his work, technical points seemed worth noting. It should be remembered that these considerations of rough handling, large size, and reduced color are historical factors that link Still with other Abstract Expressionists. Technical observations assume that Still, despite his disclaimers, belongs to history. □

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Quotation from "The United States And The Armenian Question, 1894-1924," by Ralph Elliott Cook, and presented as public service by Mark D. Bedrossyan, author of play, "The First Genocide."

Crossword Puzzle No. 1728

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 and 6 What the actuary did, perhaps, is something we occasionally take. (10, 4)
10 The sound of your car should be, though an error came first. (7)
11 Little by little, it might be sung in church. (7)
12 It might convey certain information as to how to write your name in letters.
13 Partly responsible for the creation of Paris. (5)
15 The answer could be tough, as was bound to be. (5)
17 Is the vision good enough for military command? (4,5)
19 Is Harold commonly at 6 across with it, by chance? (9)
21 This carrier might be extra (or at least spare). (5)
23 Bring back help to work with the platforms. (5)
24 Eats away the central parts, having another term for a heater inside. (8)
27 Set apart. (7)
28 Can you only see the top of such lettuce? (7)
29 and 30 Get Frank to read badly, one might assume this way. (4,3,7)

DOWN

1 and 14 down Prospective plebes might, to see what it's like, to make a long story short. (4,2,3,5)
2 Getting the ball up in a good deal of tin, generally. (7)
3 Not necessarily a knight, but one might lance a lot in fighting. (5)
4 The stars of a dead Roman, possibly.
5 A number dined here, by the sound of it—possibly at this time. (5)
7 The answer takes getting used to, in an upper-class circle. (7)
8 Comes out of a tree, so milk comes in different measures. (10)
9 Portions of an animal might be used in defense. (8)
14 See 1 down
16 Rip off. (4,4)
18 Thus one grinds out writing on the back. (9)
20 Where one might find horses with the soft part of the foot cut off. (7)
22 The height of early nighttime relaxation? (7)
24 I believe the Latin part mediocre, don't you?(5)
25 Does it take more than one work to make this possibly the grand type? (5)
26 Old form of "Egad!" (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1727

ACROSS: 1 and 20 From start to finish; 6 Ogham; 9 Outings; 10, 11 and 15 down Begin at the beginning; 12 Lesson; 13 Hopi; 15 Bullfrog; 16 Whiter; 23 Note; 24 Tables; 25 and 18 Pungently; 28 Isotope; 29 Rooming; 30 Green. DOWN: 1 and 31 Front and center; 2 Oatmeal; 3 Single file; 4 Assessor; 5 and 19 To be or not to be; 6 Orgy; 7 Handout; 8 Matriarch; 14 Chain store; 17 Collared; 21 Imprint; 22 Camera; 26 Niger; 27 Born.

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